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POVERTY, ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, AND THE
DEBACLE OF DOHA ROUND COUNTER-TERRORISM:
PART THREE OF A TRILOGY -
TRADE REMEDIES AND FACILITATION *
RAJ BHALA**
* Parts One and Two of the Trilogy appear as follows: Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist
Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round Counter-Terrorism: Part One of a Trilogy -
Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies, 9 UNIVERSITY OF SAINT THOMAS LAW JOURNAL issue 2
(2011, Annual Law Journal Lecture), and Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the
Debacle of Doha Round Counter-Terrorism: Part Two of a Trilogy - Non-Agricultural
Market Access, Services, and Trade Remedies, 44 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW issues 1 & 2 (2012, War Crimes Research Symposium on
International Law in Crisis). Part Three is the present article and also in honor of the
40th Anniversary Symposium in Honor of Professor Ved Nanda.
** Associate Dean for International and Comparative Law, and Rice Distinguished
Professor, The University of Kansas, School of Law, Green Hall. www.law.ku.edu. Foreign
Legal Consultant, Heenan Blaikie, L.L.P., Canada. J.D., Harvard 1989); M.Sc., Oxford
(1986); M.Sc., London School of Economics (1985); A.B., Duke (1984). Marshall Scholar
(1984-86). Member, Council on Foreign Relations, Royal Society for Asian Affairs, and
Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. Author of the monograph Trade, Development, and Social
Justice (Carolina Academic Press 2003), treatise Modern GATT Law (Sweet & Maxwell,
2005, 2nd ed., forthcoming), textbook International Trade Law: Interdisciplinary Theory
and Practice (LexisNexis, 3rd ed., 2008), reference Dictionary of International Trade Law
(LexisNexis, 2008), and textbook Understanding Islamic Law (SharT'a) (LexisNexis,
2011).
I am grateful to my spring 2011 Advanced International Trade Law class for many
excellent research papers, which provided many insights and sources incorporated into
this article, including the papers by Hannah Sandal and Joseph R. Billings, both of the
University of Kansas School of Law Class of 2011, and Sarah R. Schmidt, Class of 2013.
This article assumes familiarity with Parts One and Two of the Trilogy, and my
five prior publications on the Doha Round, at least with the relevant substantive concepts
and events that occurred between the launch of the Round in November 2001 and
negotiations as of July 2009:
1)Poverty, Islam, and Doha, 36 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 159-96 (2002), which covers
the launch of the Round in November 2001.
2)Chapters 3 and 4 of the International Trade Law textbook, referenced above,
particularly concepts and terms in the negotiations, and the status of those talks
through the July 2007 Draft Modalities Texts issued by Ambassadors Crawford
Falconer (New Zealand) and Donald Stephenson (Canada), Chairmen of the
Agriculture and Non-Agricultural Market Access negotiations, respectively.
3)Doha Round Schisms: Numerous, Technical, and Deep, 6 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 5-171 (fall/winter 2008), which covers the Round
through the July 2008 collapsed Ministerial meeting.
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I. Synopsis
This article is the third and final part of a trilogy, the argument of
which is that the Doha Round is a failed instrument of counter-
terrorism. The Round, launched in November, 2001, was supposed to
make the world safe for free trade, but not simply to realize net
economic welfare gains from reductions in barriers to cross-border flows
of goods, services, and intellectual property. Rather, the original intent
was to connect those gains to the threat posed by violent extremist
organizations ("VEOs") in the post-9/11 world. The gains were intended
to be channeled, in no small part, to poor, marginalized Muslim
communities that otherwise might be recruitment grounds for VEOs
acting (falsely, to be sure) in the name of "Islam."
As the Doha Round dragged on through the first and now second
decade of the new millennium, the commercial self-interest of World
Trade Organization ("WTO") Members dwarfed their shared political
economic interest. They lost sight of the common good in fighting
poverty, thereby attacking one factor exploited by VEOs. They invented
(post hoc, of course) new reasons for the Round, such as fighting the
global economic slump (as Part One concludes). Their behavior became
a reason in itself as to why implementing the initial vision for the
Round proved difficult, such as the negotiating positions of China (as
Part Two concludes). Plausible or not, all such reasons spelled a
collective failure to follow through on the founding promise of the
Round: drawing a clear link between freer trade, poverty alleviation,
and threat reduction. I
Part One of the trilogy advances this argument in the context of
trade liberalization in agricultural products. Part Two does so in the
context of trade liberalization in industrial products ("non-agricultural
market access," or "NAMA"), and services trade. Part Three makes the
argument in the context of trade remedies, so called "rules" covering
antidumping ("AD"), countervailing duties ("CVD"), and fishing
subsidies. It also does so in the context of trade facilitation, which
refers to customs procedures. As with Parts One and Two, the context
of Part Three is technical. The devil, in the sense of straying from the
initial purpose of the Doha Round, is in the details, in the sense of
lengthy, mind-numbing draft modalities texts. The Texts critically
analyzed here are the December 2008 Draft Rules Text, 2 April 2011
1. See, e.g., World Trade Talks End in Collapse, BBC NEWS (July 29, 2008, 22:46
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/7531099.stm.
2. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM
Agreements, TN/RL/W/236 (Dec. 19, 2008) [hereinafter, New Draft Consolidated Chair
Texts], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/rulesneg-e/rules_chair-text nov
07_e.pdf.
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Rules Document, 3 December 2009 Draft Trade Facilitation Text,4 and
April 2011 Trade Facilitation Document.5
This Part completes the trilogy with comments on the missing
middle "D" in the Doha Development Agenda ("DDA"). It also charts
out, in a preliminary manner, potential special dispensations in
international trade law for Islamic countries. Consequently, Part Three
concludes where Part One began, and where the Doha Round did, too:
with thoughts about how to link trade liberalization to poverty
alleviation, and thereby reduce vulnerability to Islamist extremism.
These concluding observations, like those of Parts One and Two,
support the trilogy's overall argument that the Round is not about trade
liberalization, poverty alleviation, or reducing threats from VEOs.
II. No REMEDY FOR REMEDIES
Formally entitled the Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and
SCM Agreements, this 94-page document includes a so-called "Road
Map for Discussion" to help reach agreement on fishing subsidies, as
well as trade remedies against dumping and subsidization. 6 The basic
goal of Doha Round rules negotiations is to "clarify and improve"
disciplines.7 After all, since the WTO was born on 1 January 1995 (and
as of November 2009), Members have launched over 3,500 AD
investigations (with developing countries - particularly Argentina,
3. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, TN/RL/W/254 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter, Agreement on
Implementation of Article V1], available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/ddae/
chair.../adp-subsidies-e.doc.
4. See Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Draft Consolidated Negotiating
Text, TN/TF/W/165 (Dec. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text],
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tn/TF/W165.doc.
5. See Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text
- Revision, TN/TF/W1165/Rev.8 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter, Revised Draft Consolidated
Negotiating Text], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tn/TF/W165
R8.doc.
6. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, at 1; see also Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, at 1-2; Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the
AD and SCM Agreements, TN/RL/W/213 (Nov. 30, 2007) [hereinafter, Draft Consolidated
Chair Texts] available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/.. .e/ruleschair text nov07_e.doc
(a previous iteration of the text). This Synopsis is based on a paragraph-by-paragraph,
line-by-line comparison of the December 2008 and November 2007 Draft Rules Texts.
7. Rules, BRIEFING NOTES, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/statuse/
rulese.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (posted in connection with the Seventh Ministerial
Conference held in Geneva from 30 November - 2 December 2009). Also within the ambit
of the Rules negotiations is the clarification and improvement of disciplines on regional
trade agreements (RTAs). There are over 400 RTAs, with more than half of world trade
conducted under an RTA. Id. The WTO has yet to pass judgment on any of them as to
whether they meet the requirements of GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V. The
Doha Agenda, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
e/whatis e/tif e/dohal-e.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
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China, India, and South Africa - accounting for the majority of such
cases) and 202 CVD investigations.8 Chairman Valles conceded up
front there was essentially nothing novel in his "new" Draft. On all
three topics - AD, CVD, and fishing subsidies - the disagreement
among WTO Members was serious, with no obvious prospect of
convergence, and easily sufficient to scupper a successful outcome to the
Round.
What was new, however, was the activism in the December 2008
Draft Rules Text. There was far less of it than in its predecessor.
Rather than proposing specific compromise language, as he had done in
the previous iteration, the Chairman took a bottom-up approach, and
offered such language only on points where Members had reached a
consensus on a solution. Because they had reached so few consensuses,
the new Text was more of an essay with questions and issues than a
legal document.9
Indeed, as to fishing subsidies, Members essentially forced the
Chairman to abandon the proposals he tabled in November 2007 and
return to the proverbial "drawing board." In respect of AD and CVD
remedies, the December 2008 and November 2007 Draft Texts were
nearly identical, except for the unmistakable emphasis in the new Text
on points of disagreement in lieu of proposed language to facilitate
accord. The Chair inserted these points in bold, and put them in square
brackets, at the relevant spots in the WTO Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (Antidumping, or "AD", Agreement) and Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM" Agreement).10 Because
these insertions replaced draft AD and CVD provisions, giving the
documents the sense of reverse momentum, it was ineluctable that the
later Text was less advanced than its predecessor. Moreover,
depending on the perspective of the Member, the reversal was
especially troubling."
8. Rules, supra note 7.
9. New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, 1.
10. These Agreements are reprinted in a variety of sources, including RAJ BHALA,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE - DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT, 339-66, 431-78 (3rd ed. 2008).
11. See, e.g., The Bureau of National Affairs, Direction of WTO Talks "Unacceptable,"
U.S. Steelworkers President Gerard Says, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 12 (Jan. 1, 2009)
(reporting that United Steelworkers (USW) President Leo W. Gerard and his union
strenuously objected to any re-writing of AD or CVD rules that would weaken America's
trade defenses, such as a prohibition on zeroing, a requirement to separate out causal
factors in determining injury, a mandatory termination of orders under Sunset Reviews, a
ban on disbursing AD duties or CVDs to aggrieved domestic industries, a lesser duty rule,
or a public interest test).
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By April 2011, WTO Members registered little progress in reaching
consensus on rules about AD, CVD, or fishing subsidies. Accordingly, in
his cover note to the April 2011 Rules Document, the Chairman of the
Negotiating Group on Rules said he chose to prepare a revised legal text
on AD, i.e., a new WTO AD Agreement, but not one on CVDs or fishing
subsidies. Regarding the April 2011 Draft AD Agreement, the
Chairman stated:
This should not be understood to mean that I perceive
significant signs of convergence on the major "political"
issues. To the contrary, it is noticeable that the new text
contains the same twelve bracketed issues as the 2008 Chair
text. The 2008 Chair text on anti-dumping does however
contain extensive un-bracketed language on a wide range
of technical but nevertheless important issues, and our
work over the past two plus years has pointed to a few
areas where useful changes to that language might be
warranted. In short, therefore, arguably a new text on
anti-dumping can usefully reflect some limited progress,
and in any event it can serve to give a clear idea of where
things stand. 12
As for CVDs, the Chairman elected to prepare a report instead of a
revised text:
I have chosen to prepare a report rather than a text for
the following reasons. First, as with anti-dumping, there
have been no significant signs of convergence on bracketed
issues as reflected in the 2008 Chair text on subsidies and
countervailing measures. Furthermore, unlike in the area
of anti-dumping the amount of un-bracketed text in the
area of subsidies and countervailing measures is limited,
and some of that language (such as that relating to
regulated pricing and to the role and interpretation of the
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies) is controversial. And
while on certain more technical issues un-bracketed
language has gained some traction, there are very few
useful changes to be proposed at this point. In the area of
transposition of possible changes in anti-dumping
provisions to their counterpart CVD provisions, insufficient
discussion has occurred to date to allow the identification of
12. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, at 201 (emphasis
added).
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legal language reflecting convergence. Finally, a
significant number of substantive new proposals have been
submitted during the past few months. Due to time
pressure, the Negotiating Group has not yet fully explored
the degree to which any elements of convergence can be
found in respect of these proposals. Thus, I see no
advantage to preparing a new SCM text at this juncture.' 3
Likewise, as for fishing subsidies, the Chairman stated gloomily:
2. After careful consideration of the current state of play ...
I have concluded that I am not now in a position to present
a revised legal text on fisheries subsidies. Rather, the only
option available to me at this juncture for both capturing
such progress as has been made, and more significantly, for
identifying the numerous remaining gaps in Members'
positions, is to present a detailed narrative report.
3. In reaching this conclusion in these difficult
circumstances, I have heard very clearly the main message
from Members to Chairs that for now, any Chair-produced
documents must be of a bottom-up nature. That is,
Members have made plain that they would not welcome
compromise proposals from Chairs that would seek
artificially to bridge the real gaps in positions that remain.
Applying this standard to the fisheries subsidies
negotiations, at present there is too little convergence on
even the technical issues, and indeed virtually none on the
core substantive issues, for there to be anything to put into
a bottom-up, convergence legal text, and there are no
fisheries subsidies disciplines already in existence to which
we could refer or revert. Nor would a text with either a
small range of options, or with all positions and proposals
presented as "options," be feasible. The former would
require me to pick and choose, and thus would not be
bottom-up. The latter would probably be impossible to
produce as one text that was comprehensible. In any case,
such a text would be nothing more than a compilation of
13. Id. (emphasis added); see also Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Negotiations on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures: Report by the Chairman, 1 2 TN/RL/W/254 (Apr. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter Negotiations on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures], available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-elchair.../adpsubsidies e.doc (providing the same
summary).
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proposals, which I consider could only impede movement
toward convergence.
6. After those discussions ended [in 2009, following
issuance of the December 2008 Rules Text], Members
began to submit new proposals. While initially there were
only a few, by late 2010 and to date in 2011 proposals
proliferated . . . . While many of the proposals contain new
ideas and some suggest new approaches on certain issues,
unfortunately in their totality (and with a few exceptions)
these could not be characterized as convergence proposals.
Rather, they generally reflect and elaborate on the already
well-known positions of their proponents. Nor has there
been movement toward convergence over the course of the
debate on the proposals. Thus, in spite of many meetings
since the beginning of the year [2011] - indeed a nearly-
continuous session of the Negotiating Group - and in spite
of the wealth of new proposals, little tangible progress on
the core issues has been made. In short, notwithstanding
intensive work and greater clarity in scoping several
issues, the fisheries subsidies negotiations remain in more
or less the same impasse as at the end of 2008 . . . with
positions if anything hardening since then. 14
Thus, as of April 2011, the textual landscape for Doha Round rules
negotiations was slightly more confusing than it had been in December
2008. On AD, Members had produced a revised AD text, but it looked
like the November 2007 and December 2008 Draft Texts. As for CVD
and fishing subsidies rules, they still were working with the December
2008 Draft Text, but supplemented it with the April 2011 Rules
Document.
A. Twelve AD Fights
In respect of AD, the December 2008 Draft Rules Text highlighted
12 key areas of dispute. So, too, did the April 2011 Draft AD
Agreement. They were as follows: 1 5
14. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies: Report by Chairman, TT 2-3, 6
TN/RLIW/254 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/chair.../
adp-subsidiese.doc (emphasis added); see also Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI, supra note 3, at 1 (providing a similar synopsis).
15. These areas are set out in bold and brackets in the New Draft Consolidated Chair
Texts after the Article, and replace draft proposals set out in the same places in the Draft
Consolidated Chair Texts. These areas also are set out in bold and brackets in the
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*Zeroing (Article 2.4:2 of the AD Agreement)
In December 2008, the Chairman best summarized the impasse:
"Delegations remain profoundly divided on this issue. Positions range
from insistence on a total prohibition of zeroing irrespective of the
comparison methodology used and in respect of all proceedings to a
demand that zeroing be specifically authorized in all contexts."16
Similarly, in April 2011, he observed zeroing:
remains among the most divisive in the anti-dumping
negotiations, and there have been few signs of convergence.
Positions range from insistence on a total prohibition on
zeroing irrespective of the comparison methodology used
and in respect of all proceedings to a demand that zeroing
be specifically authorized in all contexts. Some delegations
however hold more nuanced positions, and there is
openness among some delegations to undertake a technical
examination of this issue in particular contexts, such as for
example the third ("targeted dumping") methodology
provided for in Article 2.4.2.17
Put succinctly, the rest of the world - and that included Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey that
banded together in a group totaling 16 WTO Members called "Friends of
Antidumping Negotiations" ("FANs") - insisted on a ban on zeroing. 18
The assertion was the amount of dumping (positive dumping margins)
should be reduced (offset) by non-dumped sales (negative dumping
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI. See generally RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 871-1045, 1111-78 (3rd ed. 2008)
(for a treatment of AD law).
16. New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, art. 2.4.2, chairman's note
("Zeroing").
17. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 2.4.2, chairman's
note ("Zeroing") (emphasis added).
18. Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: Antidumping Critics Argue Latest Report Highlights
Need for Doha Rules Agreement, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 637 (May 14, 2009); Daniel
Pruzin, Dumping, Countervailing Duties: China Urges Ban on Zeroing in Dumping
Investigations as Part of WTO Rules Talks, 23 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 695 (May 4, 2006);
Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists on
Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203-04 (Feb. 12, 2009); Rules,
supra note 7. That the U.S. is the only country opposing a ban on zeroing has been widely
reported. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, WTO: Senior Officials to Address Talks on Rules;
Advocates Call for Progress in Light of Crisis, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1605 (Nov. 26,
2009).
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margins). Without that ban, the deck would remain stacked against
respondent producer-exporters, as dumping margins would be inflated
artificially, and the use of the AD remedy would be abusive.
The FANs spoke from experience, as the United States ("U.S.")
frequently used zeroing when calculating dumping margins against
their exporters. The FANs were successful in causing a major change
in the Draft Text from November 2007. The earlier Text embodied the
American position, permitting Simple Zeroing in original investigations,
and both Simple and Model Zeroing in Administrative and Sunset
Reviews.' 9 Nonetheless, the U.S. adamantly stuck to its position there
would be no successful conclusion to the Doha Round unless Members
agreed to overrule legislatively the string of what it regarded as
erroneous Appellate Body precedents against zeroing.20 Only that
solution, said the U.S., would allow it and other Members to impose an
AD duty on the full amount of dumping - a right they have under
Article 9:3 of the AD Agreement. Consequently, the likelihood that the
FANs and U.S. might agree on a compromise, such as to ban zeroing in
all contexts except targeted dumping, was dim.
* Causation (Article 3:5 of the AD Agreement)
Members could not agree on how to handle three practical
causation questions that arise in virtually every AD case. First, should
it be mandatory to separate and distinguish the allegedly injurious
effects of (1) dumped imports and (2) other factors, so as to avoid
attribution of those effects to dumped imports when, in fact, other
factors might be the cause? Second, to what extent is a quantitative, as
distinct from a qualitative, analysis of non-attribution necessary?
Third, to what degree should the allegedly injurious effects of dumped
imports be weighed against those effects from other factors?
In April 2011, the Chairman summarized the positions among
WTO Members:
Delegations continue to hold widely diverging views on
issues relating to causation of injury. Recent discussions
19. See Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S.
Insists on Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203-04 (Feb. 12, 2009).
See BHALA, supra note 15, at 1023-25 (3rd ed. 2008), for the distinction between Simple
and Model Zeroing.
20. Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S. Maintains
Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072-73 (July 15, 2010). See RAJ
BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 530-34 (2008), for a tabular summary
of those rulings. See also Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Anti-dumping
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, T 66 WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008) (adopted
May 20, 2008).
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have focused on two issues: whether it should be mandatory
to separate and distinguish the effects of dumped imports
and other factors, and the extent to which authorities
should be required to conduct a quantitative (as opposed to
qualitative) analysis of non-attribution. Although there
seems to be a shared view that authorities should carefully
consider the effects of factors other than dumped imports,
and ensure they are not attributed to dumped imports,
there are substantial gaps regarding the degree of precision
that can or should be required. 21
The importance of resolving causation issues cannot be overstated.
Through a series of trade remedy cases over several years, the
Appellate Body had grappled with such issues. As a general principle of
law across legal systems, it is unjust to impose liability against a party
that is blameless. That the Members could not agree on how to
manifest this principle, in light of the WTO jurisprudence that had
emerged, was evidence of how little progress they had made.
* Material retardation (Article 3:8 of the AD Agreement)
Dumping is not actionable unless it causes or threatens to cause
injury, or unless it materially retards the establishment of a domestic
industry. How tightly should the term "material retardation" be
defined? When is an industry "established"? The Chairman said in the
April 2011 Draft AD Agreement:
There is a broadly expressed view that the provisions
of the Agreement regarding material retardation would
benefit from amplification and clarification, and many
elements of the 2007 Chair text attract broad support.
There are however widely divergent views on the core issue
of when an industry is "in establishment." Most notably,
while some delegations consider that an industry might still
be in establishment even if there was some domestic
production, other delegations consider that once there is any
domestic production an industry is no longer "in
establishment," and in such cases the proper analysis is one
of current injury or threat.22
21. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 3.5, chairman's note
("Causation of Injury") (emphasis added).
22. Agreement on Implementation of Article VY, supra note 3, art. 3, para. 8 (first
emphasis added).
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In other words, some Members argued an industry might still be in
the process of getting established, even if there is a small amount of
domestic production. Other Members said any such production means
the industry is established, and thus the injury analysis must focus on
actual injury or threat thereof.
* Definition of domestic industry (Article 4:1 of the AD Agreement)
What criteria should be used to exclude (1) producers that are
related to exporters or importers, and (2) producers that also are
importers, from the definition of a domestic industry? That definition is
essential in delineating the class of petitioners potentially entitled to
AD relief, as well as determining at the outset whether the petitioners
have standing to bring an AD case. The Chairman explained in April
2011:
There are widely varying views about the need for
criteria governing this exclusion, and about the nature of
any possible criteria. In particular, some delegations
consider that the rules should be precise, reflecting
numerical criteria, and directive in nature. Other
delegations believe that any criteria should not be too
prescriptive, as the assessment must be case by case. Yet
other delegations do not exclude such producers and believe
that no changes to these provisions are necessary. 23
In essence, four issues were at stake.
First, should producers that are related to exporters or importers,
or that are themselves importers, be excluded from the "domestic
industry" that would benefit from an AD remedy? Assuming the
answer is "yes," then, second, what degree of affiliation should trigger
the exclusion? That is, how close can a producer be to an exporter or
importer before that producer is cast out of the universe of petitioners?
Closely connected to the second issue, third, is how the proximity
should be measured? Would precise, numerical criteria, or a loose, case-
by-case analysis be better? Following logically from the third issue,
fourth, how should the measurement criteria be selected? In particular,
which criteria would both protect the sovereignty of Members, and be
less expensive and time-consuming to administer? 24
23. Id. art. 4, para. 1 (emphasis added).
24. See Rossella Brevetti, Dumping, Countervailing Duties: New Revised Draft Doha
Texts Released on Dumping, Subsidies for Further Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 27
(Jan. 1, 2009).
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*Definition of subject product (Article 5:6 of the AD Agreement)
Should a provision be added concerning the product under
consideration - i.e., the good subject to an AD investigation or subject
merchandise - to clarify how that product is defined? The Chairman
stated in the April 2011 Draft AD Agreement:
While many delegations consider that a provision on
this issue would be useful, concerns have been expressed
that such a provision could have "'vertical" as well as
"horizontal" implications (e.g., with respect to the inclusion
of parts), as well as implications in respect of subsequent
proceedings. These concerns have caused some delegations
to link this issue to the outcome of discussions on anti-
circumvention, while other delegations reject any such
linkage. There are also differences of view regarding, inter
alia, how broadly the product under consideration should
be defined, the role of physical and market characteristics
in determining the product under consideration, and when
and how [the] product under consideration should be
determined. 25
Some Members argued a new provision defining "subject
merchandise" would focus the scope of an investigation, hence the above
reference to linking the issue to anti-circumvention. The U.S. had first-
hand experience with problems of circumvention created by Chinese
producer-exporters subject to AD orders. But, other Members feared a
definition, if too broad, might implicate related products in a vertical
and horizontal sense and thereby bring (for example) parts of a product
into an investigation. That outcome would be unfair to the implicated
producer-exporters. Redolent of the controversies of defining a "like
product" under Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), Members also failed to agree on the extent to which
criteria such as physical and market characteristics should be used to
"subject merchandise." 2 6
*Information requests to an affiliated party (Article 6:8 of the AD
Agreement)
Members could not agree on how to treat an interested party in an
AD investigation that has been asked for information. 27 Some Members
25. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 5, para. 6 (emphasis
added).
26. See id.
27. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 8.
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thought such a party should not be deemed non-cooperative if it fails to
provide data about an affiliate that it does not control. Other Members
thought a deemed exemption would encourage non-cooperation based
on an excessively narrow view of "control." 28
*Public Interest Test (Article 9:1 of the AD Agreement)
The November 2007 Text included a public interest requiring each
WTO Member to have a procedure whereby no AD remedy could be
imposed without taking due account of the views of interested domestic
parties. They include industrial and retail users of the subject
merchandise and domestic-like product, and suppliers of inputs to the
domestic industry. The European Union (EU) backed this proposal.
The U.S. stood in opposition, on the ground these changes would
infringe on the sovereignty of a Member to impose and collect AD duties
in the manner it deems suitable. 29
In the December 2008 Text, the Chairman summarized aptly the
wide gap in positions over these topics:
Participants are sharply divided on the desirability of a
procedure to take account of the representations of
domestic interested parties when deciding whether to
impose a duty. Some consider that such a procedure would
impinge on Members' sovereignty and would be costly and
time-consuming, while others support inclusion of such a
procedure. Issues related to any such procedure include
the extent to which any such procedures should apply in
the context of Article 11 [administrative and sunset]
reviews, whether the ADA's [AD Agreement] requirement
for a judicial review mechanism should apply to decisions
pursuant to any such procedure, and the extent to which
WTO dispute settlement should apply. 30
In April 2011, the Chairman repeated the first two sentences
(above), but modified the third sentence, as follows:
Issues related to any such procedure include the
elements that can or should be taken into account in any
28. Id.
29. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S.
Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072 (July 15, 2010);
Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists on
Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 12, 2009).
30. New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, art. 9, para 1.
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public interest proceeding, the extent to which any such
procedures should apply in the context of Article 11
reviews, whether the ADA's requirement for a judicial
review mechanism should apply to decisions pursuant to
any such procedure, and the extent to which WTO dispute
settlement should apply.3'
This modification indicates the disagreement among Members had
widened further. Not only did it include procedures, judicial review,
and dispute settlement, as it had before, but also included the elements
to consider in a public interest hearing. In other words, the Members
could not agree on what "public interest" meant.32
These disagreements pitted the U.S. against the EU and many
other Members. But, they also divided constituencies within many
Members. Predictably, consumer groups championed a public interest
test, and producer groups steadfastly opposed it.
*Lesser Duty Rule (Article 9:1 of the AD Agreement)
Also included in the November 2007 Text was a lesser duty rule.
Such a rule states a WTO Member need only impose an AD duty up to
the level necessary to rectify dumping, which may be less than the full
amount of the dumping margin. The EU backed this rule, as its AD law
contains one. The U.S. stood in opposition, for the same reason it
opposed a public interest test: infringement on the sovereignty of a
Member to impose and collect AD duties in the manner it deems
suitable. 33
In the December 2008 Text, the Chairman summarized aptly the
large gap in positions over the issue:
On lesser duty, many delegations strongly support
inclusion of a mandatory lesser duty rule. Other
delegations oppose the inclusion of such a rule, with one
delegation noting that it was not practically possible to
calculate an injury margin. Among those supporting a
mandatory lesser duty rule, there are varying views about
31. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 1 (emphasis
added).
32. Id.
33. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S.
Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072 (July 15, 2010);
Daniel Pruzin, Dumbing: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists on
Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 12, 2009).
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the appropriate degree of specificity for any new rules and
the extent to which those rules should prescribe or
prioritize particular approaches to determining the
appropriate level of duty. 34
The situation scarcely had changed by April 2011, with the
Chairman providing a similar summary at that time:
Many delegations strongly support inclusion of a
mandatory lesser duty rule. Other delegations oppose with
equal conviction the inclusion of such a rule, with one
delegation noting that it was not practically possible to
calculate an injury margin. Among those supporting a
mandatory lesser duty rule, there are varying views about
the appropriate degree of specificity for any new rules and
the extent to which those rules should prescribe or
prioritize particular approaches to determining the
appropriate level of duty. Some delegations have indicated
that at a minimum language in the current Agreement
regarding the desirability of applying a lesser duty should
be maintained.35
Here again, the issue pitted not only the U.S. against the EU and
many other Members, but also divided constituencies within many
Members. Predictably, consumer groups championed a lesser duty rule,
and producer groups steadfastly opposed it.
* Anti-circumvention (Article 9:5:3 of the AD Agreement)
Should an express set of rules to deal with circumvention of an
existing AD order be added? Circumvention occurs when a foreign
producer-exporter that is the target of an AD order seeks to evade the
order by shipping (1) subject merchandise in parts or unfinished forms,
(2) a slightly modified version of the merchandise, or (3) components to
a third country, assembling them in the third country, and then sending
them to the importing country that maintains the order. 36 If so, then
what numerical thresholds should be used to find dumping, injury, and
causation? Should anti-circumvention measures apply to all imports of
the product in question from a country, or target only imports from a
34. December 2008 Draft Rules Text, supra note 2, art. 9, para. 1 (emphasis added).
35. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 1 (emphasis
added).
36. Daniel Pruzin, Dumbing: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists
on Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 12, 2009).
252 VOL. 40:1-3
DEBACLE OF DOHA ROUND COUNTER-TERRORISM
specific producer-exporter, i.e., should the measures be country - or
company - specific?
Members disagreed on all these questions. 37 As the Chairman
summarized in the April 2011 Draft AD Agreement:
Delegations disagree as to whether there should be
specific rules on anti-circumvention. Some delegations
consider that the only appropriate reaction to perceived
circumvention is to seek initiation of a new investigation,
while other delegations consider that anti-circumvention is
a reality, and that rules on anti-circumvention are
necessary to achieve some degree of harmonization among
the procedures used by different Members. To the extent
that rules are included, delegations disagree, inter alia,
what types of circumvention should be addressed (with
particular concern expressed regarding the use of anti-
circumvention measures in respect of exports originating in
a third country), whether numerical thresholds are
desirable, whether findings of dumping, injury and
causation should be required and whether anti-
circumvention measures should be company-specific or
country-wide.38
Thus, one group, including the U.S. and EU, argued special
multilateral rules are needed, especially to harmonize the existing
array of national-level rules. They were dismayed at the deletion from
the November 2007 Text of a specific provision that would have allowed
a WTO Member to extend the scope of an AD order if that Member
discovered an exporter covered by the order sought to circumvent it.
Another group, including China, felt victimized by American and
European anti-circumvention measures, and opposed any inclusion in
the Draft Text of anti-circumvention rules. This group said the only
appropriate response to alleged circumvention is to launch a new AD
investigation. 3 9
*Sunset reviews (Article 11:3 of the AD Agreement)
The Members disputed the appropriate criteria for initiating and
conducting a sunset review (that is, a review of an AD order five years
37. See id.
38. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 5.3
(emphasis added).
39. See Negotiating Group on Rules, Proposed Provision of Anti-Circumventing,
TN/RL/W/216 (Feb. 12, 2008).
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after its imposition). Members also disagreed sharply on what ought to
happen after a sunset review. In the April 2011 Draft AD Agreement,
the Chairman explained:
Delegations have widely differing views regarding
various aspects of the sunset issue. There is sharp
disagreement as to whether there should be any automatic
termination of measures after a given period of time and, if
so, after how long. On the two extremes of this issue are
those delegations that favour automatic termination after
five years without any possibility of extension and those that
reject the principle of automatic termination altogether.
Other issues dividing delegations include whether there is a
need for additional standards and criteria governing sunset
determinations and, if so, what standards and criteria
would be most appropriate; what rules should apply to the
initiation of sunset reviews, including whether there should
be limitations on ex officio initiation, and proposed
standing and evidentiary thresholds for initiation; and the
timeframes for completion of investigations. 40
In brief, some Members argued an AD remedy must terminate
automatically after five years, with no possibility of extension. Others -
such as the U.S. - rejected automatic termination, and were pleased by
the deletion of a proposal in the November 2007 Text that would have
capped the duration of any AD remedy at 10 years. 41
* Third country dumping (Article 14:4 of the AD Agreement)
Should the rules allowing for investigation and prosecution of a
dumping claim on behalf of a third country (i.e., that dumping in an
importing country is causing injury to a domestic industry not in that
country, but in a third country) be scrapped, or should they be revised
to make them operational (i.e., more user-friendly, and thereby more
practical than as set out in the AD Agreement)? Alternatively, should
the possibility of a third country dumping action be eliminated entirely
from the Agreement? The Chairman stated in the April 2011 Draft AD
Agreement:
40. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
41. See generally Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S.
Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072, 1072 (July 14,
2010); Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists
on Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 12, 2009).
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Some delegations support new rules that would
eliminate the requirement for Council for Trade in Goods
approval to take anti-dumping action on behalf of a third
country, as in their view the current rules are unworkable.
Other delegations do not rule out such new rules, but
consider that many other issues about how such actions
would be taken would need to be resolved before they could
reach a judgment on the desirability of operationalizing
anti-dumping action on behalf of a third country. Yet other
delegations question whether it is desirable to
operationalize this provision at all, with certain delegations
preferring that the provision be deleted entirely. 42
The three-way split among Members again illustrated the lack of
progress since December 2008. Third-country dumping, while not
insignificant, ought not to have been a vexatious issue. Surely hard
work, coupled with flexibility, could have produced a compromise for
such an action, subject to strict, technical disciplines.
* Special and Differential (S & D) treatment (Article 15 of the AD
Agreement)
On a topic of manifest interest to poor countries in the Islamic
world, there was no consensus among WTO Members as to whether
developing and least developed countries ought to get any preferential
treatment beyond the modest special regard they are supposed to be
accorded under the AD Agreement. In the April 2011 Draft AD
Agreement, the Chairman explained:
The Group has continued to examine issues relating to
special and differential treatment for developing Members,
both as exporters and as users of anti-dumping. While
some delegations advocate flexibilities for the investigating
authorities of developing Members, for example in respect of
initiation of investigations, other delegations are cautious
about such flexibilities, particularly in light of the fact that
many developing Members are now active users of anti-
dumping. Regarding technical assistance, some delegations
propose creation of a trade remedies facility that would
assist smaller and resource restricted developing Members
to develop the capacity to use such remedies. While some
delegations oppose any facility that would assist Members
42. Agreement on Implementation of Article V7, supra note 3, art. 14, para. 4
(emphasis added).
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to use trade remedies, others consider that all Members
have an equal right to use trade remedies in a WTO-
consistent manner.43
So, after a decade of multilateral negotiations ostensibly dedicated
to development, Members could agree neither on whether poor
countries ought to have S & D treatment in respect of AD actions, nor
on whether they should get legal training to handle them.
To close observers of the Doha Round, none of these 12
controversies was a surprise. That is because their origins lay in the
birth of the Round. The U.S. consistently maintained that modifying
AD (or other trade remedy) rules to improve transparency and due
process were acceptable. 44  But, the U.S. cautioned, substantive
modifications to rules were not, as that would exceed the Doha Round
negotiating mandate. The fact the December 2008 Rules Text and April
2011 Draft AD Agreement could highlight controversies, but not suggest
language to resolve them, underscored their severity.
This fact also underscored how the Round drifted from its original
purpose growing out of the September 11 terrorist attacks. AD (and
other trade remedies) can sharply circumscribe the market access of
producer-exporters from developing and least developed countries to
developed country markets. Ensuring an AD investigation is not
abused for protectionist purposes that serve narrow domestic industry
interests in the U.S. or other developed country, but undermine long-
term national security interests in both the petitioner and respondent
countries, is a matter WTO Members ought to have considered. Neither
side gains if jobs and incomes are lost in a poor country because the
merchandise of a producer-exporter in that country is knocked out of an
important export market by an AD duty. The Members also ought to
have considered ways to bolster the technical legal capacity of
developing and least developed countries to bring and defend AD cases.
Neither side gains if those jobs and incomes are lost either because the
poor country was unable to combat bona fide dumping in its own
market, or fight a case effectively when the behaviour of one of its
producer-exporters is challenged abroad.
43. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 15 (emphasis
added).
44. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S.
Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072 (July 15, 2010).
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B. Five CVD Fights
As for CVDs, the December 2008 Draft Rules Text and April 2011
Rules Document emphasized five critical areas of unresolved
controversy: 45
*Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy (Article 14(c) of the SCM
Agreement)
Should a new provision be added covering government financing of
loss-making institutions?46 The provision would deal with official loan
or loan guarantees provided to institutions that incur long-term
operating losses and also with funding to state-owned enterprises
("SOEs") that are not credit- or equity-worthy. As the Chairman
explained in the April 2011 Rules Document:
This issue originated in a proposal by the European
Union to create a new category of prohibited subsidies
covering the provision by virtue of government action of
financing to a wide range of industries on terms and
conditions inadequate to cover the long-term operating
costs and losses of such financing, where this benefited
exported goods. 47
Some Members argued the addition was needed to discipline trade-
distorting financing schemes, which had proliferated in the fall 2008
with the onset of a global economic recession. Other Members fiercely
opposed any change, because it would discriminate against SOEs. Still
other Members, mindful of the global financial crisis triggered in
September 2008, did not want to constrain their policy space to deal
with prudential measures during a financial crisis. 48
* Export Competitiveness (Article 27:5-6 of the SCM Agreement)
Article 27:5 of the SCM Agreement accelerates the period during
which a developing country must phase out its export subsidies from
eight years (calculated from the date of the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement, i.e., 1 January 1995) to just two years, if the country has
45. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3; see RAJ BHALA,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 847-51 (2008) (explaining general
treatment of CVD law).
46. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Negotiation on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Reports by the
Chairman, 5-8, TN/RL/W/254 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/dda_e/chair... /adp subsidies_e.doc.
47. Negotiations on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13, para. 5.
48. Id. T 8.
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reached export competitiveness in the subsidized product. 49 Article
27:6 defines "export competitiveness" as a share in world trade of that
product of at least 3.25 percent calculated for two consecutive calendar
years. Egypt, India, Kenya, and Pakistan found two problems with
these rules.50
First, they said they sought to lengthen the period during which
the export competitiveness of a product is determined. 51 They called for
a change to a five-year moving average. By using a moving average
over five-years, aberrational determinations of export competitiveness
due to temporary market fluctuations would be avoided. Second, they
advocated the flexibility to allow for the re-introduction of an export
subsidy to a product that loses its export competitiveness. 5 2 The SCM
Agreement is silent as to whether a subsidy can be reintroduced under
this circumstance.
But, many Members resisted these proposals. 53 Some Members
thought a five-year base period is too long, and queried how to
operationalize the flexibility to reintroduce an export subsidy.5 4 Other
Members opposed any change to the measurement period, and were
skeptical of reintroducing an export subsidy, as it would upset the
balance between minimizing trade-distortive effects of such subsidies on
the one hand, and the need for subsidies in poor countries on the other
hand. 55
* S & D Treatment (Article 27:6 of the SCMAgreement)
The SCM Agreement entitled developing countries to phase out
export subsidies over a longer period of time than developed countries.
It also allowed them to keep these subsidies in respect of a particular
product until they had reached export competitiveness in that product
market (defined as 3.25 percent of world trade in 2 consecutive years).
Members argued over two questions.
First, should the definition of a product that could receive an export
subsidy be refined? Second, should a developing country be free to
restore a subsidy if it loses export competitiveness in a product market,
after having reached competitiveness, and if so, under what criteria and
for how long? In failing to resolve their differences, they again missed
49. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 27.5, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 14.
50. Id. 27.6; Negotiations on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13,
9.
51. Negotiations on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13, T 9.
52. Id.
53. Id. 9-11.
54. Id. T 11.
55. Id.
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an opportunity to fashion rules that could be of help to Islamic
countries.
* Export credits and market benchmarks (Annex I, Illustrative List
of Export Subsidies items ()-(k), of the SCM Agreement)
Should export credits continue to be measured in terms of the cost
incurred by the subsidizing government to provide these credits? Or,
should they be gauged by the benefit they confer on a recipient? Some
Members, especially developing countries, said the existing cost-to-
government methodology was both inconsistent with the general
definition of a "subsidy" in Article I of the SCM Agreement, and
disadvantageous to developing countries. 56 As the Chairman explained
in the April 2011 Rules Document:
This issue was first raised in a proposal by Brazil to
amend item (j) and the first paragraph of item (k) of the
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies (Annex I) to reflect a
benefit to recipient basis for identifying prohibited export
subsidies in the forms of export credits and guarantees, in
place of the existing cost to government-based language.
One concern underlying the proposal is that the generally
higher government costs of funds in developing compared
with developed countries means that a cost-to-government
standard for export credits and guarantees will put
developing country exports of capital goods at a structural
disadvantage. If the developing Member provides export
credits at rates covering its cost of funds, the rates will be
systematically higher than those offered by developed
countries using their own cost of funds as the benchmark.
If the developing country were to match the terms offered
by the developed country, it would have to provide credits
at below its own cost of funds, and thus would run afoul of
the prohibition in the first paragraph of item (k). A further
concern behind the proposal is that the cost to government
language of the provision is inconsistent with the
Agreement's general definition of "subsidy."57
In other words, a developing country was at special risk of running
afoul of the rules on prohibited export subsidies and being subject to an
especially high CVD rate, because of the relatively higher cost of funds
in developing versus developed countries. The idea championed by
56. Negotiation on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13, 12.
57. Id.
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Brazil was to account for this reality by measuring export credits and
guarantees based on the benefit to recipients, not the cost to the
government. Yet, other Members opposed this development-friendly
idea as development-unfriendly.58
Opponents argued using the benefit-to-recipient approach would
boost costs for developing country borrowers, because it would reduce
predictability (i.e., increase uncertainty) for government agencies that
grant export credits, and thereby reduce the overall amount of
financing available. 59 In turn, the cost of financing would rise, and
purchasers of financed goods would pay more for those goods. Those
purchasers often are other developing countries, which tend to import
rather than export capital goods, and are helped by such goods financed
with inexpensive export credits. Finally, opponents contended, the cost-
to-government is the internationally accepted standard methodology.
* Export credits and successor undertakings (Annex I, Illustrative
List of Export Subsidies item (k), of the SCM Agreement)
Should changes the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) might make in its Export Credit Arrangement
automatically have effect in the SCM Agreement? The Chairman set
out the problem in the April 2011 Rules Document:
15. This issue originated in the same proposal by Brazil on
export credits [discussed above], which in respect of the
second paragraph of item (k) [of the of the Illustrative List
of Export Subsidies (Annex I) to the SCM Agreement]
proposed that any changes made to the "undertaking"
referred to therein following the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round would need to be adopted by consensus of WTO
Members. For Brazil this is an issue of systemic concern, as
the "undertaking" in question is the Arrangement on
Officially Supported Export Credits, to which only a small
number of WTO Members are parties, and changes to which
are negotiated and approved at the OECD. Via the second
paragraph of item (k), however, that undertaking
establishes a safe harbour from the SCM Agreement's
prohibition for certain export credit practices, and panels
have interpreted the provision's reference to "successor
undertaking" to mean the most recent version of the
Arrangement adopted by its parties. Brazil thus is
concerned that this interpretation means that a small
58. Id. 12, 14.
59. Id. T 14.
260 VOL. 40:1-3
DEBACLE OF DOHA ROUND COUNTER-TERRORISM
group of countries operating outside the WTO can change
WTO rules applicable to all Members. A number of
delegations, including some parties to the Arrangement,
objected to this proposal, which in their view would be fatal
to the Arrangement. They consider that the Arrangement
works well to discipline export credits, and that the
frequent updating that it requires to remain current with
market developments could easily be blocked at WTO by a
Member for political reasons unrelated to the Arrangement
itself.
17.. . . On the one hand, some delegations consider that
any rules that will be binding on WTO Members must be
adopted by consensus decision of those Members. In this
regard, the clarification was made that only changes to the
"interest rates provisions" of the Arrangement would need
to be submitted to the WTO for approval, as only these
provisions are relevant to the safe harbor in the second
paragraph of item (k). Others, however, remain concerned
over the potential for WTO Members to veto evolutions of the
Arrangement. They note that only a small number of non-
OECD countries actually provide medium- and long-term
export credits, and that these countries often are invited to
participate in negotiations of revisions to the Arrangement.
They consider that the OECD has expertise in the area,
and note its recent outreach initiatives to expand
participation in the Arrangement. In their view, WTO
Members with no interest in export credits should not have
the opportunity to block necessary changes to the
Arrangement, and one institution should not be able to
block the coming into force of agreements reached in another
institution.... .0
In brief, some Members thought changes in the OECD
Arrangement should take effect through the SCM Agreement,
essentially for the sake of efficiency, and because the OECD has
expertise in the field. Others demanded the right to veto, in the WTO
context, any changes made by the OECD, so that the subset of Members
participating in that Arrangement could not change the rules on export
credits for the entire Membership.
60. Id. TT 15, 17 (emphasis added).
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In October 2010, China started a sixth battle over the SCM
Agreement.61 It proposed that the Agreement be amended to include an
Annex with disciplines on the use of "facts available" in CVD
investigations, akin to the Annex in the AD Agreement.
The proposal served China's self-interest: China was stung by the
large number of CVD investigations launched against Chinese exports,
particularly since 2007, when the DOC altered its long-standing policy
against imposing the CVD remedy on imports from non-market
economies ("NMEs"), of which China is one. "Facts available" may come
from a petitioner in a CVD investigation, or sources of information
other than the respondent foreign producer-exporter. An investigating
authority may rely on such facts if the respondent either does not
produce information it requests, or fails to provide useable
information. 62 Many CVD cases brought in the U.S. against Chinese
merchandise have resulted in the imposition of CVDs on the basis of
facts available. 63
So, proposed China, a new Annex to the SCM Agreement ought to
create a safe harbour: an investigating authority must consider the
"reasonable ability of the interested Member [i.e., the exporting country
from which subject merchandise is shipped] or the interested party [i.e.,
the respondent] to supply a response" to a request for information. 64
Critically, the authority, said the proposal, "shall not maintain a
request for the information . . . if presenting the information as
requested would result in an unreasonable extra burden on the
interested Member or the interested party."6 5 On its face, the proposal
was problematic. How could an investigating authority in an importing
country judge the "reasonable ability" of the target foreign country or
respondent, especially given that they have an incentive to claim
disability? Would the standard of "unreasonable extra burden"
engender rounds of litigation at the WTO as to what it means? In brief,
if the Chinese proposal was aimed at combating what it called biased
and abusive CVD investigations, then surely the proposal erred too far
in the other direction, and would impede fact-finding - that is, obstruct
justice - via frivolous claims of disability and burden.
61. See Negotiation on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13, 1 29-
30; Daniel Pruzin, China Seeks in Doha Talks to Narrow Use of "Facts Available" in CVD
Investigations, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1586 (Oct. 21, 2010).
62. Pruzin, supra note 61.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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C. No Remedy for Small-Scale Muslim Fisherman, Either
As if the aforementioned battles on AD and CVD were not enough
in number or intensity, fishing subsidies were the topic of yet fiercer
conflict. On these subsidies, the December 2008 Draft Rules Text and
April 2011 Rules Document were more disheartening than on AD and
CVD. WTO Members had leapt backwards from where they appeared
to have been in November 2007.
Fishing subsidies are not extraneous to negotiations about trade
remedies. Rather, they concern governmental support in a particular
sector, and thus are squarely within the kind of measure subject to a
classic trade remedy, namely, a CVD. Moreover, their link to poverty is
obvious. "Over two billion people depend on fish as a major source of
protein and income."66 Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Somalia, and
Yemen are among the examples.67 That also is true of non-Muslim
countries with large Muslim coastal communities, including India, the
Philippines, and Thailand. 68 Such countries are not necessarily the
most blameworthy in terms of causing or exacerbating the over-fishing
crisis.
Rather, it is developed countries that have considerable resources
to subsidize large-scale commercial fishing fleets. The long-distance
fishing fleets of the EU and China are not commercially viable, and
survive only because of government subsidies for fuel, other operational
expenses, and vessel construction and maintenance.69 For example,
this support allows foreign fleets to obtain more, bigger, and faster
boats than they otherwise would have.
Even when developed countries seek to cut such subsidies and
provide alternative support to their fisherman to use environmentally
sustainable catch methods, the fishermen do not always behave. In
May 2011, for example, an undercover operation by the EU Fisheries
Commission to crack down on illegal fishing discovered Italian
fishermen use drift nets (which span several kilometres in length) to
catch swordfish and Atlantic bluefin tuna. 70 The tuna, which migrate
66. See Amy Tsui, Members of Congress Ask USTR to Ensure WTO Talks Include End
to Fishery Subsidies, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1167 (July, 14 2011) (quoting a letter
dated 6 July 2011 to U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Ron Kirk from 12 Senators
and 30 Members of the House of Representatives).
67. See Andrew W. Speedy, Animal Source Foods to Improve Micronutrient Nutrition
in Developing Countries: Global Production and Consumption of Animal Source Foods,
133 J. NUTRITION 4048S, 4050S-52S (2003).
68. Id.
69. See Tsui, supra note 66.
70. Guy Dinmore & Eleonora de Sabata, Covert Mission Finds Sicily Skippers Still
Use Drift Nets, FIN. TIMES May 2011, at 21-22 (stating that as a result, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) is likely to impose significant monetary penalties against Italy).
See generally Seth Korman, Note, International Management of a High Seas Fishery:
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to the Mediterranean Sea, along with dolphins, sharks, turtles, and
whales, and some birds, are endangered species, all of which are
ensnared in drift nets.71 Thus, the EU banned drift nets in 2002, and
subsidized its fishermen to desist from their use. The Italian fishermen
pocketed the subsidy, flouted the ban - and Italian authorities,
including the Coast Guard, did nothing. 72 Consider, then, the impact
on the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean - all of
which, save for Israel, are Muslim. Their smaller-scale fishermen
suffer from stock depletion caused by their European counterparts.
Nonetheless, from the American perspective, the link between
disciplines on fish subsidies to promote sustainable development, on the
one hand, and alleviating poverty and susceptibility to Islamist
extremism on the other hand, was lost. In the words of four former U.S.
Trade Representatives (USTRs), William Brock, Carla Hills, Susan
Schwab, and Clayton Yeutter, in an April 2011 letter to President
Barack H. Obama, America viewed the matter as an opportunity to "set
a historic precedent by showing that trade can directly benefit the
environment while promoting jobs, exports, and open markets."73 That
is, at stake for the U.S. was an environmental measure that would not
interfere with market access for American fish exports.
America focused on its commercial and recreational fisheries
interests, which account for over two million jobs in the U.S. 74 For U.S.
policy in the Doha Round, the possibility subsidies by foreign
governments might be at cross-purposes with America's counter-
terrorism efforts was of marginal (if any) importance. Rather, they
mattered because they undermined opportunities for American
exporters in third countries, by putting American fisherman at a
disadvantage. For example, by cutting operating costs of foreign
producers and exporters, they injured American coastal communities.
Even environmental groups, such as Mission Blue, Oceana, and the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) emphasized fishing subsidies "undermine[]
U.S. trade opportunities in potential export markets" by "creating an
uneven playing field and reducing the stocks on which U.S. fishers
depend." 76 In truth, both rationales matter, or should.
Political and Property-Rights Solutions and the Atlantic Bluefin, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 697-
748 (2011), for a discussion of some of the pertinent issues relating to fishing subsidies.
71. Dinmore & de Sabata, supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. Rossella Brevetti, Allgeier Says Success of Fisheries Pact at WTO Would Help Sell
Doha Package, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 768 (May 12, 2011) (emphasis added).
74. See Tsui, supra note 66.
75. Rossella Brevetti, Environmental Groups Ask Obama for Strong Fisheries
Subsidy Pact in WTO, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 848 (May 26, 2011) (paraphrasing a
letter dated 11 May 2011 from these three environmental groups to President Barack H.
Obama).
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Unsurprisingly, by April 2011, the only points on which WTO
Members agreed were incontrovertible facts:
* A global crisis of overcapacity and overfishing exists, with over
85 percent of the world's fisheries being overexploited, fully exploited,
depleted, or in need of recovery, and with 63 percent of fish stocks
around the world requiring rebuilding.76 In April 2011, the Chairman
intoned:
The longstanding blockage in these negotiations exists
in spite of the strong consensus among delegations of all
sizes and levels of development that the state of global
fisheries resources is alarming and getting worse. Indeed
all delegations, when referring to data, rely on the same
statistics - those published by the FAO [United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization] - the latest of which
show that 85 per cent of world fish stocks are either fully-
or over-exploited. All recognize that this is a crisis of
exceptionally serious implications for all humankind, and
particularly for the poor in many countries who are heavily
dependent on fisheries as a source of nutrition and
employment. Nor is there disagreement that developing as
well as developed countries are major participants in global
capture fishing, and that all countries face a common
problem and share responsibility to contribute to finding
solutions, although not necessarily on a uniform basis. 77
* The crisis is due in part to the $30-34 billion annually (as of
2006) governments grant as fishing subsidies, including $20 billion
(equivalent to 20-25 percent of revenues) to increase the capacity of
fleets to fish for longer periods, more intensively, and at further
distances. As the Chairman put it: "most [Members] agree that
subsidies play a major role in contributing to these problems [of
overcapacity and overfishing], and that this is what is behind the
76. See World Trade Organization, Briefing Notes - Rules, available at www.wto.org
/english/tratop-eldda e/status e/rules-e.htm; Amy Tsui, Members of Congress Ask USTR
to Ensure WTO Talks Include End to Fishery Subsidies, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1167
(July 14, 2011) (quoting a letter dated 6 July 2011 to USTR Ambassador Ron Kirk from
12 Senators and 30 Members of the House of Representatives); Jonathan Lynn, Activists
Say Fish Deal Hostage to WTO Deadlock, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2009, 12:50 PM),
www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/29/us-trade-wto-fish-idUSTRE59S3X920091029.
77. Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, T 12.
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negotiating mandate to strengthen disciplines on fisheries subsidies,
including through a prohibition."78
* Overall, annual fishing subsidies (as of 2010) equal about 20
percent of the value of the world catch of fish. 79
* Seven industrialized countries account for 90 percent of the
subsidies - Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, Russia, Taiwan, and the
U.S.80
* Fishing subsidies provided by the EU and Japan have helped
contribute to a worldwide fishing fleet that is about 250 percent larger
than needed to fish at sustainable levels.81 Ominously, Brazil and
China are increasing their subsidies nearly to the level of the
industrialized countries. 82 Over 50 percent of the large vessels that
engage in unsustainable fishing are Chinese, and the Communist Party
supports them with fuel subsidies.83
* The crisis has adverse economic and environmental effects. 84 It
also has impacts on nutrition and health, because over one billion
people rely on fish as the key source of their protein.85
Despite widespread appreciation of these facts, the Members could
not agree on a common strategy to deal with the crisis. Their
disagreement persisted, as the April 2011 Rules Document indicated
essentially no progress had been made from December 2008 through
mid-2011. 86
78. Id.
79. See Rossella Brevetti, Environmental Groups Ask Obama for Strong Fisheries
Subsidy Pact in WTO, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 848 (May 26, 2011).
80. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Rules Chair Admits Little Progress on Sticking Points, Issues
Fisheries Warning, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1641 (Dec. 3, 2009).
81. Amy Tsui, USTR Hopes to Use Doha WTO Talks, TPP to Eliminate Fishing
Subsidies, Support Oceans, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1103 (July 22, 2010).
82. Id.
83. See Rossella Brevetti, Allgeier Says Success of Fisheries Pact at WTO Would Help
Sell Doha Package, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 768 (May 12, 2011).
84. See December 2008 Draft Rules Text, supra note 2, Annex VIII, T 2; Jonathan
Lynn, Activists Say Fish Deal Hostage to WTO Deadlock, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2009, 12:50
PM), www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/29/us-trade-wto-fish-idUSTRE59S3X920091029.
85. See Jonathan Lynn, Activists Say Fish Deal Hostage to WTO Deadlock, REUTERS
(Oct. 29, 2009), www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/29/us-trade-wto-fish-idUSTRE59S3X92
0091029.
86. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Criticizes WTO Chief Lamy's Assessment of Doha
Impasse, Says NAMA Not Only Issue, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 724 (May 5, 2011).
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The Members were split three ways:
1) First, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were skeptical of a link
between subsidies and over-fishing.
2) Second, the so-called "Friends of Fish" on the other side -
consisting of Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, New
Zealand, Norway, Iceland, Pakistan, Peru, and the U.S. -
sought stringent disciplines on fisheries subsidies.87
3) Third, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico
demanded exceptions, i.e., S & D treatment that would
allow flexibility to deviate from any such disciplines for
poor countries.88
The desire of the second group for stringent disciplines clashed
head-on with the skepticism of the first group. The demands of the
third group caused consternation among the second group, which feared
exceptions for developing countries would undermine any new
disciplines.
Accordingly, the Members disputed eight key areas:
* Benchmarks?
What metrics should be used to gauge the existence of overcapacity
or overfishing objectively and precisely?
* Judge?
Should individual Members be permitted to self-judge overcapacity
and overfishing?89 Or, should some other party, group, or institution
make those judgments?
87. See World Trade Organization, Briefing Notes - Rules, available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/statuse/rulese.htm. See also Amy Tsui, USTR
Hopes to Use Doha WTO Talks, TPP to Eliminate Fishing Subsidies, Support Oceans, 27
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1103 (July 22, 2010) (quoting Senator Ron Wyden (Democrat -
Oregon), Chairman, Senate Finance Committee Subcommittee on International Trade,
Customs, and Global Competitiveness, telling Mark Linscott, Assistant USTR for
Environment and Natural Resources: "Let me just give you something to take back to
Geneva - no fish subsidies agreement, you will have my opposition. Congress in my view
is not going to accept it and all you have to do is look at this Committee to get an idea of
how powerful this issue is.").
88. See Daniel Pruzin, Officials at WTO Cite Mixed Results from Doha
"Brainstorming" Sessions, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1543 (Oct. 14, 2010).
89. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, Annex VIII, 6.
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* Fisheries Management?
Should the core of a deal on fisheries subsidies be obligations about
fisheries management, or a prohibition on subsidies? As the Chairman
explained in April 2011:
91. From the outset of the negotiations, the issue of
fisheries management has figured prominently in the
debates. Some delegations argue that if proper management
is in place, subsidies cannot cause either overcapacity or
over-fishing. Others, however, consider that while fisheries
management is important, it cannot on its own combat the
pressure for overcapacity and overfishing brought to bear by
subsidization. In their view, the global crisis in fish stocks
is ample evidence that fisheries management by itself is
inadequate to control overcapacity and overfishing. In this
regard, the example of the North Atlantic cod industry has
been cited.
92. These differences of view in turn are reflected in
very different proposals as to the role that fisheries
management should play in the disciplines. Delegations
holding the former view consider that fisheries management
should form the core of the new rules, and that the subsidy
disciplines should play the auxiliary role of creating
incentives for Members to adopt strong management
systems. Their proposals thus are to shorten the list of
subsidies to be prohibited, and to make these prohibitions
subject to certain management-related conditions (such as
subsidizing the replacement of retired vessels with vessels
of smaller capacity), and/or to put greater emphasis on
adverse effects provisions, in which the existence and
operation of the fisheries management system would play a
pivotal role in determining whether subsidization had
caused overcapacity and overfishing in a particular
situation.
93. Other delegations, however, maintain that the core
of the disciplines must be a prohibition of certain subsidies,
and that fisheries management should be a conditionality
for making use of exceptions from the prohibition (whether
general exceptions or exceptions under special and
differential treatment). They further consider that while
having fisheries management in place can be a relevant
factor in assessing whether non-prohibited subsidies have
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caused adverse effects to fish stocks, this by itself should
not be sufficient for a successful rebuttal of a claim. 90
In brief, Members could not agree on the basic paradigm for an
agreement - whether it was about resource management or subsidy
prohibition. This disagreement, of course, begged an important
question: what are the key features of "fisheries management" to which
all Members should adhere?91
* Prohibition?
How should the scope of the fishing subsidy prohibition be
delineated? 92 Should the subsidies ban apply to a comprehensive list,
i.e., a broad and strict prohibition, with coverage including a ban on
support for:
1) construction of new fishing vessels;
2) repair and modification of existing vessels;
3) operating costs of vessels and in- or near-port processing
activities;
4) fuel;
5) port and other infrastructure facilities;
6) incomes of fishermen;
7) prices of fish products;
8) destructive fishing practices;
9) overfished fisheries;
10) transfer of fishing or service vessels (from one to another
country);
11) illegal, unreported, and unregulated ("IUU") vessels;
12) transfer of access rights (whereby one country that pays for
fishing access rights in the waters of another country sells
those rights to a third country)?93
Or, should a conditional approach to prohibition be used, allowing
for certain fishing subsidies, such as artisanal (i.e., small scale)
fisheries, natural disaster relief, de minimis support, and barring only
subsidies most harmful to global fishing stocks?94
90. Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, 91-93 (emphasis added).
91. See id. 94-95.
92. See id. 11 17-18.
93. See id. f 25-45.
94. See id. IT 20-24; New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, 5; see
Pruzin, supra note 88.
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Related to these questions was how to draft a prohibition. Should a
positive list of subsidies, akin to Article 1:1 of the SCM Agreement, be
created, with the scope of prohibited subsidies on the list "modulated by
general exceptions"? 95  Or, would a negative list, identifying only
particular types of subsidies as unlawful, be appropriate?
* Exemptions and S & D Treatment?
For the benefit of poor countries, what specific types of fishing
subsidy programs might be exempt from a prohibition on fishing
subsidies, above and beyond the general exceptions to which any
country could have recourse?96 Accordingly, Members had failed to
agree on the possible exemptions for developing and least developed
countries from any ban on fishing subsidies, as well as on technical
assistance for such countries. 97 As the Chairman stated in April 2011:
... virtually all of the proposals for special and differential
treatment are based on permanent exceptions from various
prohibitions, in various circumstances and subject to
various conditions . . . . That said, there are fundamentally
different visions as to how S&DT [special and differential
treatment] should be structured, what particular
exceptions should be provided in which particular
circumstances, and what conditions should apply to the
different exceptions. 98
Among the possible exemptions were subsidy programs:
1) that contribute only minimally to overcapacity or
overfishing;
2) whose effects could be controlled adequately by a fisheries
management scheme;
3) that focus on small operations, i.e., a "bottom tier" of
activities that relate to artisanal (small-scale) or
subsistence fishing, which would not contribute to
overcapacity or overfishing; 99 or
4) that are important to the economic development of a poor
country. 100
95. Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, T 10.
96. See generally id. TT 46-83 (describing proposed subsidy exceptions for developing
countries, including a tiered proposal structure).
97. See id. 82 (concerning technical assistance).
98. Id. 46.
99. See id. TT 58-67.
100. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, T 5.
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Members contested the parameters for exemptions, as well as the
exemptions themselves. For example, how should "subsistence" fishing
to be measured? How does it differ from "artisanal" activities? Would
income and price support, funding for port infrastructure, and subsidies
for the construction of small-decked and undecked vessels qualify for an
exemption, because they matter to economic development? 01 In this
respect, fuel subsidies, and support for other operating costs, were a
"very divisive" topiC.102
Should flexibilities for poor countries to derogate from any ban on
fishing subsidies extend to support for activities on the high seas, that
is, beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") of those countries?103
This question also provoked heated debate.
Developing countries argues that equity suggested, "yes." Poor
countries "are latecomers to high seas fisheries, and should be able to
use whatever means they deem necessary in order to catch up to the
developed world." 104 International law also suggested, "yes," because,
"all countries have the right to a share of fisheries in international
waters, but. . . the cost advantages of developed Members' fishing fleets
are too great for [developing countries] to overcome without
subsidies." 05 Fairness, too, suggested, "yes." "Developed countries are
responsible for the overfishing of high seas stocks," but now seek to
"impose a standstill on high seas fishing."106 That standstill would hurt
the vulnerable resources, i.e., spawning and juvenile stocks, within the
EEZs of developing countries. Nature, also, counseled for an
affirmative answer: the distinction between EEZs and the high seas is
artificial, because many stocks are highly migratory. 107
Developed countries offered strong rebuttals. First, the high seas
are "the most biologically and politically vulnerable" fishing areas, as
there is no national jurisdiction and thus no mechanism to ensure the
''internationally-shared fisheries resources" are managed
sustainably.108 Second, any fishing activity outside of an EEZ is by
definition "highly industrialized," not subsistence or artisanal, even if a
poor country engages in such activity.109 So, all countries should be
101. See Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, paras. 68-69.
102. Id. para. 73.
103. See id. paras. 75-81.
104. Id. para. 76.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. para. 77.
108. Id. para 79; see also id. para. 81 (describing the problems of enforcing sustainable
conditions for a S & D treatment exception that allows for a subsidy for fishing activities
on the high seas).
109. Id. para. 80.
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subject to the same subsidy disciplines on high seas fishing. Third, a
poor country can protect its spawning and juvenile stocks with a sound
"national fisheries management" program. 110
At the heart of the disagreement lay the fact poor countries
demanded S & D treatment in connection with a problem for which they
are partly to blame. The Chairman indicated as much in April 2011:
47. Among the considerations cited frequently in this
context is the important role of developing countries in
world marine capture production. According to FAO
statistics, six of the top ten fishing nations, and 11 of the top
15, are developing countries, and developing countries
collectively account for about 70 per cent of global capture
production. For many Members, given these facts S&DT
cannot simply be a blanket carve-out from the disciplines for
all developing Members, as in their view this would render
the overall discipline ineffective. A number of developing
Members, while stressing that they do not seek a simple
blanket carve-out, nevertheless consider the absolute
figures to be misleading in that they mask the comparative
efficiency and magnitude of countries' fishing activities,
and thus their relative impacts on global fisheries
resources. They argue instead that the use of catch per
capita, or catch per fisher, as alternative measures, show
that developing countries make less impact on global
resources than do developed countries.
48. Some of the differences in the approaches advanced
by different Members appear to relate to the different
rationales advanced for S&DT in the particular context of
fisheries subsidies disciplines. In this regard, objectives of
S&DT that have been referred to in the discussions and
proposals include: (1) poverty alleviation, i.e., assistance for
vulnerable, disadvantaged populations; (2) development of
the fisheries sector as a source of jobs, income and trade,
both to lift people out of poverty and to create new
opportunities for economic development and linkages;
(3) building up domestic capacity to exploit the fisheries
resources within the national jurisdiction; (4) enhanced
policy flexibility for Members with a small share of global
fish catch, on the grounds that they have at most a
negligible impact on global overcapacity and overfishing;
(5) extending domestic fishing activities beyond coastal
110. Id.
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areas, both into the EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] and (in
some cases) into the high seas, to relieve pressure on
coastal fisheries resources, including spawning and
juvenile populations; (6) "catching up" to the developed
world in terms of vessels, technology, scale, and areas of
operation; and (7) exercising rights under international law
to exploit commercially valuable fish stocks in
international waters, the products of which are traded
internationally. All proposals and discussions emphasize
the need for the subsidies to be deployed and the subsidized
activities to be conducted in a sustainable manner,
although like the different approaches to the S&DT
exceptions, the proposed approaches to the accompanying
sustainability conditionalities vary greatly.II'
In other words, there was considerable debate over the guilt of poor
countries, and the theory underlying any S & D differential treatment
they might get. Unsurprisingly, the Members could not agree on the
practical matter of how to calibrate the nature, scale, and geographic
scope of their activities that should be exempt from any disciplines.112
Also unresolved, then, were the precise fisheries management
obligations a poor country would have to implement before having
access to an S & D treatment exception that permitted it to subsidize its
fisheries in some manner. Presumably, these obligations would require
the country to implement "internationally-recognized best practices,
including regular science-based stock assessments."113  And, what
transition rules would apply to developing and least developed
countries, so that they might have more time to phase in their
obligations?114
Finally, whether S & D treatment should be tailored for different
categories of poor countries was in dispute. Members generally agreed
least developed countries ought to get the best of S & D treatment.115
But, they worried that some developing, and even some developed,
countries might behave unscrupulously and try to take advantage of the
exemptions designed for least developed countries. And, they could not
agree on whether distinctions should be made among developing
countries. Obviously, doing so along the lines of the draft agriculture
and NAMA proposals (e.g., with differentiations for net food importing
developing countries ("NFIDCs"), certain recently acceded members
111. Id. 47-48.
112. See id. T 10.
113. Id.
114. See id. 11.
115. See id. 49.
2012 273
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
("RAMs"), and small, vulnerable economies ("SVEs")), or along new
lines (e.g., distinguishing developing countries with a small share of
global wild fish capture) would risk making the fishing subsidy rules
vastly more complex. 116
* Notification?
What scheme should be used for Members to notify one another of
their fisheries subsidies, particularly if they sought to invoke a general
or S & D treatment exception? 117 How much advance notice must a
Member provide?118 To what forum should notice be given - the FAO,
WTO, or some other entity?119 What information would be sufficient to
demonstrate that a Member qualified for an exception? 120
Related to problems of notification were questions of what to do
with information in a notification? Should there be a review of the
practices of the notifying country, and if so, what kind of review should
it be?121 For example, if notification is to the FAO, then should it be
empowered to render a judgment as to the soundness of the fisheries
management system in a poor country, and the entitlement of that
country to invoke an exception? Would this judgment be binding?
Could it be used in a WTO adjudicatory proceeding? Should a non-
notified subsidy be presumed rebuttably to be prohibited?122
* Remedy?
To be meaningful, any discipline on fishing subsidies would have to
have associated with it a remedy for breach.123 Likewise, an unlawful
subsidy would have to be attributed to the subsidizing government, not
the flag of the vessel carrying subsidized fish (otherwise, it would be
easy to circumvent the disciplines).12 4 And, the rule of origin for
fisheries product, used for customs and labeling purposes, would not
affect this attribution. But, what should the legal criteria for the
remedy be?
Should the "traffic light" scheme of the SCM Agreement be used,
whereby certain subsidies are forbidden ("red light") as long as they are
specific, and are presumed irrefutably to cause adverse effects, while
116. See id.
117. See id. IT 11, 97.
118. See id. 99-100.
119. See April 2011 Rules Document, Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies - Report by
the Chairman, TN/RLIW/254, Part III.E IT 101-02 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/chair.. ./adp-subsidies-e.doc.
120. Id. 11, 104.
121. See id. 11, 101-03.
122. Id. 11, 97.
123. See id. TT 11, 84.
124. Id. 11, 84, 90.
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other subsidies are actionable ("yellow light") if they are both specific
and cause adverse effects?125 What sort of "adverse effects" should be
actionable - only those in relation to fish stocks, such as over-capacity
and over-fishing, or any effect on trade?126 What test should be used to
establish a causal link between adverse effects and subsidization?12 7 IS
the mere absence of strong resource management enough to deem such
a link exists, or must more be shown?
As to the remedy, should it be limited to a CVD, as per Article 7:9
of the SCM Agreement?128 Or, should a WTO panel or the Appellate
Body be empowered to fashion a different sort of remedy? Should the
remedy be the same for all types of fish, or should a distinction be made
for highly migratory stocks?129 Should the remedy cover only fish from
the "same stock," or also a "directly competitive product"?130
* Enforcement?
What methods should be used to monitor and survey any exempt
fishing subsidy programs, to ensure the integrity of the prohibition is
not undermined and thus to help prevent overcapacity and
overfishing?131 For instance, should inspectors from the FAO review
whether a poor country is implementing its fisheries management
obligations?132
Thus, Chairman Valles simply put to the Members in his "Road
Map" a long list of questions concerning fundamental issues to
address.13 3 They were back to square one.
These issues were under the negotiating mandate Members
undertook three years before the Draft Text, in the December 2005
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. And, following the Seventh
Ministerial Conference in Geneva in November-December 2009, the
Chairman readily admitted no progress had been made in the year
125. See id. para. 5.
126. Id. para. 87.
127. Id. para. 89.
128. See id.
129. Id. para. 88.
130. Id.
131. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, 17.
132. See Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, T 10.
133. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, TT 10-11 (concerning the
prohibition of fishing subsidies), 12-13 (concerning general exemptions from the
prohibition), 14-15 (concerning S & D treatment), 1 16 (concerning general disciplines
on, and actionability of, fishing subsidies), T1 17-20 (concerning fisheries management),
21-22 (concerning transparency), 1 23 (concerning dispute settlement), TT 24-25
(concerning implementation), TT 26-27 (concerning transition rules).
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since he issued his Text (i.e., since December 2008).134 Chairman Valles
elaborated on that depressing conclusion in April 2010. Deciding to
retire from his post as Chairman after six years, and return to
Uruguay, he said the bottom-up approach embodied in the December
2008 Text had been fruitless, and - worse yet - Members had made no
significant progress after eight years of negotiations on bridging
differences on AD or CVD rules. 135 His successor, Ambassador Dennis
Francis of Trinidad and Tobago, wrote in April 2011:
13. . . . . [W]hat then is the problem? Why have these
negotiations been underway for 10 years with little
tangible progress in finding a solution? In my view, it
seems that most (although not all) delegations, rather than
seeking to build convergence by indicating acceptance of the
appropriate level of disciplines (and of the policy changes
that this would imply), to effectively address what is
undeniably a common and rapidly worsening problem,
appear to be focusing principally on maintaining their own
status quo by placing on "others" the main responsibility to
implement solutions, while minimizing the impact of
disciplines on their own activities. Thus in spite of the
nearly universal calls for disciplining subsidies in an
effective way, many delegations in practice seem to elevate
the exceptions above the disciplines. For some developed
Members, a main reason given is that subsidies are
necessary to protect traditional ways of life, vulnerable
coastal communities, and jobs in the fisheries sector. For
many developing Members, a main reason often cited is the
need for policy space to subsidize in order to harness
fisheries as a basis for development, economic growth, and
employment. In the face of the sharp and continuing
declines in the fisheries resources, however, it is hard to see
how such strategies can either protect communities and jobs
or be a source of food security and stable growth over the
long-term.
14. . . . [A] unified, long-term strategic approach to
cooperating to rationalize economic signals - including by
giving priority to collectively reducing the level of capacity-
and effort-enhancing subsidies - can actively promote and
contribute to profitability of global fisheries, with the
134. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Rules Chair Admits Little Progress on Sticking Points,
Issues Fisheries Warning, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1641 (Dec. 3, 2009).
135. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chair Cites Absence of Progress in Doha Antidumping,
Subsidies Talks, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 659 (May 6, 2010).
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hugely advantageous additional benefits of economic and
environmental sustainability. . . . [F]isheries are often
compared to the prisoner's dilemma: non-cooperative
pursuit of individual payoffs leads to overfishing, which in
turn imposes economic loss (not to mention negative
environmental effects) on all parties involved. In fact, it is
widely-accepted that the economic benefits lost due to
overfishing are significant - a World Bank Report gives an
estimate of U.S. $50 billion annually, without counting the
out-of-pocket additional costs of subsidies (estimated to be
at least U.S. $16 billion annually). To put these figures in
context, the value of the total global marine fish catch is
around U.S. $90 billion. Like the prisoner's dilemma,
however, fisheries are not a zero-sum game. Successful
subsidy negotiations can help bring about a situation
where profitability and economic and environmental
stability are mutually reinforcing, contributing to
sustainable wealth creation.
15. In order for the negotiations to make significant
progress, I am of the view that negotiators will have to
focus more on these incontrovertible realities no matter
how inconvenient, and less on protecting their short-term
defensive interests. Unless this happens, I do not hold
great prospects for the fisheries subsidies negotiations. 136
A more honest assessment is hard to come by.
III. NOT FACILITATING TRADE
A. Progress through April 2009
By April 2009, it appeared a Doha Round agreement on trade
facilitation (i.e., simplifying customs procedures, which can be a non-
tariff barrier to trade, so as to reduce the transactions costs of trade and
thereby increase trade flows by speeding up procedures for the
clearance and release of merchandise) might be within reach. A June
2010 study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics states
that reducing the costs of moving goods across international borders
could boost global Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") by over $100
136. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, IT 13-15 (emphasis
added).
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billion.1 37  Additionally, the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy,
rightly explained in June 2011:
. . . implementation of the Trade Facilitation measures
discussed in Geneva [i.e., in the Doha Round] could reduce
total trade costs by almost 10 percent ....
.. . For OECD countries it currently takes on average
about four separate documents and clearing the goods in an
average of ten days at an average cost of about $1,100 per
container. By contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa almost
double the number of documents are required and goods
take from 32 days (for exports) to 38 days (for imports) to
clear at an average cost per container of between $2,000
(for exports) and $2,500 (for imports). The overall world
champion at trade facilitation is Singapore, where four
documents are required and goods are cleared in, at most,
five days at an average cost of around $456 per container.
At the other end of the scale are many of the low-income
developing countries, in particular the landlocked
developing countries, whose trade-processing costs can
mushroom as a result of the effort required to move goods
in transit by road or rail through their neighbours to their
nearest international port. According to recent research,
every extra day required to ready goods for import or
export decreases trade by around 4 percent.
Handicapping the world's least competitive producers
and poorest consumers with additional transaction costs of
$1,000 or more for each container of goods that they
manage to export or import is clearly absurd. 138
Indeed, even a one percent improvement in cutting red tape and
streamlining customs procedures, as measured by an index of indicators
for transparency and predictability, can increase trade in industrial
goods by 0.7 percent. 13 9
137. Susan C. Schwab, After Doha, Why the Negotiations Are Doomed and What We
Should Do About It, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 104, 115 (2011). Ms. Schwab served as USTR from
2006-2009, id. at 104.
138. WTO Trade Facilitation Deal to Reduce Trade Costs and Boost Trade, Lamy,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (June 24, 2011), http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/sppl-e/
sppll97 e.htm (speech of WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy to the World Customs
Organization, Brussels, Belgium, 24 June 2011).
139. Red Tape at Port Costlier than Shipping between Ports: Economists Mull Doha's
Value, 2010 News Items, WORLD TRADE ORG (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.wto.org/
english/news e/newsl0_e/dda_02nov10_e.htm.
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Under the April 2009 Doha Round proposed agreement, developing
countries would be able to implement immediately between 30 and 50
percent of the obligations, with no technical assistance required to do
so. Implementation of the deal, however, would be part of a single
undertaking, meaning the deal was contingent on resolving the
agriculture, NAMA, services, and rules issues. 14 0 The agreement would
deal with three articles of GATT that cover transit, fees and formalities
(i.e., paperwork and documentation), and transparency of regulations -
Articles V, VIII, and X, respectively. Most if not all WTO Members
appreciated their shared interest in trade facilitation, though
developing countries were keen to avoid having heavy obligations
imposed on them, and insisted on technical and financial assistance
from developed countries to meet the burdens of implementing any
trade facilitation obligations. 141
B. Heavily Bracketed April 2011 Draft Trade Facilitation Text
On 14 December 2009, the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation
published a "Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text."142 Containing 16
Articles, it was the first draft accord in the Doha Round on the topic,
but it was replete with bracketed text. On 21 April 2011, the
Negotiating Group published a new version of the Text. Organized into
two Sections, with Section I containing Articles 1-15, and Section II
containing 10 paragraphs on S & D treatment, the April 2011 Draft
Trade Facilitation Text looked very much like the December 2009
predecessor. It, too, was replete with bracketed text. 143
The key highlights of the 37-page April 2011 Draft Text are as
follows:
*Provisions Relating to GATT Article X on Transparency of Trade
Measures
These provisions covered publication and availability of information
in Article 1, prior publication and consultation in Article 2, advance
rulings in Article 3, appeal (i.e., review) procedures in Article 4, and
other measures to enhance impartiality, non-discrimination, and
transparency in Article 5.144
140. See Amy Tsui, Trade Facilitation Agreement Bright Spot in Doha, May be
Finished in Few Months, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 507 (Apr. 16, 2009).
141. See Daniel Pruzin, Hopes Fading for WTO "Deliverables" Deal as Delegations
Take Hard Line on LDC-Plus, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1164 (July 14, 2011); DOHA
Development Agenda, Briefing Notes, Trade Facilitation, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/englishltratop-e/dda-e/status-e/tradfae.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2011).
142. See Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, supra note 4.
143. See Revised Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, supra note 5.
144. Id. arts. 1-5.
2012 279
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Article 1, Paragraph 1, called for publication of trade measures.
Article 1, Paragraph 1:1 explained such publication should be prompt,
in a non-discriminatory and easily accessible manner that enables all
governments, traders, and interested parties to become acquainted with
the relevant trade measures. The measures at issue concern (inter alia)
import, export, and transit procedures, applied duty rates, fees and
charges, rules on customs classification and valuation, rules of origin,
penalties, appeal procedures, and tariff-rate quotas. Article 1,
Paragraphs 2 and 3 required establishment of an official website and
inquiry points. Publication need only be in the vernacular of the
country at issue, but if practicable, should be in at least one WTO
language (English, French, or Spanish).14 5
Article 2 required an interval between publication and entry into
force and opportunities for interested parties to comment on trade
measures. That interval must be "reasonable," as must be the comment
period, but the precise amount of time is undefined. Also unspecified is
what constitutes an "opportunity" to comment. Indeed, whether the
chance to comment would be mandatory, or provided by a Member "to
the extent practicable," was unresolved.146
Article 3 mandated issuance by governmental authorities of
advance rulings, possibly in a maximum period of 150 days (a drop from
180 days in the December 2009 Text), with clear procedures as to how
an applicant may obtain one.14 7 An applicant could seek an advance
ruling on matters of tariff classification (and, therefore, the applied
duty rate to be imposed), customs valuation, duty drawback, tariff rate
quotas, rules of origin, and fees and charges. 148 Any such ruling must
be valid for a "reasonable" (albeit unspecified) period of time. 14 9
However, no advance ruling would be required if an adjudicatory
decision on the issue were rendered, or the matter was pending before
an adjudicatory or administrative body.150 Advance rulings would not
be precedential, but binding only on the applicant who sought the
ruling and the relevant customs agency.15 1
Article 4 obligated each WTO Member to ensure it allows for
administrative and judicial appeals of customs decisions.152 Appeal
procedures would have to be non-discriminatory, and decisions set out
supporting reasoning.153 But, to what body could an appeal be lodged,
145. See id. art. 1, paras. 1.2, 2.2.
146. Id. art. 2, para. 2.1.
147. Id. art. 3, paras. 1.1, 4.6.
148. See id. art. 3, para. 1.7.
149. See April 2011 Draft Trade Facilitation Text, art. 3, para. 13.
150. See id. art. 3, para. 1:2.
151. Id. art. 3, para. 1.3 ter.
152. Id. art. 4, para. 1.1.
153. Id. art. 4, paras. 1.3-1.5.
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and would that body have to be independent of the customs official or
agency rendering the controversial decision? These crucial questions
were unresolved.15 4
Article 5 prescribed disciplines on the issuance of import alerts (or
rapid alerts) concerning food safety, possible risks to animal or plant
health, and the monitoring of the quality of imported foods. Such alerts
would have to be based on positive evidence that food failed to meet
uniform, objective standards, possibly based on international
references. With multiple alternatives in bracketed text, there was no
consensus among Members as to the precise criteria to trigger issuance
of an alert.155 Article 5 also discussed detention and test procedures
with respect to problematic imported goods.15 6
* Provisions Relating to GATT Article VIII on Fees and Formalities
Connected with Importation and Exportation
These provisions concerned disciplines on fees and charges imposed
on imports and exports in Article 6, and requirements for the release
and clearance of goods, in Article 7. Article 6 required fees and charges
be imposed only for services rendered in connection with importation or
exportation, be limited to the amount of the services rendered, and not
be calculated on an ad valorem basis.15 7 Article 6 also required a WTO
Member to publish its fee schedule and not enforce it until an adequate
time period after publication.15 8 And, it set out limitations on the
imposition of penalties, including that they be proportionate to the
infraction, there be no conflicts of interests associated with their
assessment and collection, that a written decision accompany any
imposition of a penalty, and that the possibility of waiver of the penalty
exist if the infraction is disclosed voluntarily by the breaching party. 159
Article 7 obligated Members to maintain procedures on pre-arrival
processing, i.e., administrative procedures of a customs authority to
examine import documentation submitted by traders prior to the arrival
of goods so as to expedite the clearance and release of goods upon their
arrival, and allow for immediate release. But, Members could not agree
on whether such processing would be an entitlement for all traders or a
privilege only for traders with good compliance records.160 Article 7 also
authorized Members to separate release from final determination and
payment of customs duties and fees, i.e., to allow an importer to obtain
154. See id. art. 4, para. 1.1.
155. See id. art. 5, paras. 1.1-1.5.
156. Id. art. 5, paras. 2.1-3.4.
157. Id. art. 6, paras. 1.1-1.3.
158. Id. art. 6, paras. 1.4-1.5.
159. Id. art. 6, paras. 2.2-2.5.
160. Id. art. 7, para. 1.1.
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its goods before final decisions about the tariff liability have been made
and before importer has paid the tariff. 161
Article 7 discussed risk assessment and analysis in respect of the
potential for non-compliance with customs laws and the need to use risk
management techniques in a way that reduced the number of physical
inspections of goods. 162 Article 7 also discussed post-clearance audits
("PCA"), the establishment and publication of average release and
clearance times, and criteria for obtaining the status of an authorized
trader.163 Finally, Article 7 covered expedited shipments, requiring (or,
possibly, simply encouraging) Members to allow for the expedited
release of goods, at least for merchandise entered through air cargo
facilities. 164 Members could not agree on what "expedited" means -
release within 3, 6, 24, or 48 hours, or a "reasonable period of time"?165
Ominously, the Article 7 obligations concerning risk management
potentially conflict with post 9/11 U.S. customs reforms. Article 7
proposed that risk management, in the form of border controls, should
concentrate on high-risk shipments. But, U.S. law requires that by
2012, 100 percent of all maritime containers bound for America be
scanned overseas.16 6
* Additional Provisions Relating to GATT Article VIII
Articles 8-10 also dealt with formalities relating to importation and
exportation. Article 8 forbids a WTO Member from requiring a consular
transaction, i.e., requiring from a consul of the importing Member in
the territory of the exporting Member a consular invoice or consular
visas for a commercial invoice, certificate of origin, or other shopping
document in connection with importation of a good. 167
Article 9 called for border agency cooperation, that is, coordination
of activities and requirements among customs authorities.168 Article 9,
paragraph 9.1 bis, which Members set in brackets, required Members to
allow goods in transit (i.e., transshipped goods) to be declared as such.
Article 10 called for periodic review of formalities, and obligates
Members to minimize them and the attendant documentation
requirements so they are not "an unnecessary obstacle to trade."169
161. Id. art. 7, para. 2.1.
162. Id. art. 7, paras. 3.1-3.6.
163. Id. art. 7, paras. 4.1-6.6.
164. Id. art. 7, para. 7.1.
165. Id. art. 7, para. 7.2(c).
166. Daniel Pruzin, As Doha Talks Falter, Efforts Get Under Way on Alternative
Approaches to Salvage Gains, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 644, 644 (Apr. 21, 2011).
167. Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, supra note 4, art. 8, para. 1.1.
168. Id. art. 9, paras. 1-3.
169. Id. art. 10, paras. 1.1-2.4.
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Article 10 also called on Members to accept commercially available
information and copies, but whether they must or ought to do so was
not agreed.170 Likewise, Members could not agree on whether they
must consider whether there are "reasonably available" alternative
requirements that fulfill their "legitimate objectives" that are
"significantly less trade restrictive" than their existing rules.171 They
also could not agree on whether Members would have to rely on, or
merely ought to rely on, best practices and international standards
(e.g., as set by the World Customs Organization ("WCO")).1 7 2 Article 10
also calls on Members to establish a single window for the one-time
submission of customs documentation.1 73 Article 10 forbids Members,
to the extent possible, from mandating the use of pre-shipment
inspection (PSI) and from requiring the use of a customs broker. 174
Logically, Article 10 required Members in a customs union (CU) to
use the same border procedures throughout their CU.175 Finally, Article
10 obligated Members to allow for temporary admission of goods,
inward processing (i.e., importing merchandise temporarily into a
customs territory without payment of duty, for manufacturing,
processing, or repair, and then subsequent exportation of finished
merchandise under a different customs regime), and outward
processing (i.e., exporting merchandise temporarily from a customs
territory for manufacturing, processing, or repair abroad and then re-
importing finished merchandise with a full or partial exemption from
duties). 176
* Provisions Relating to GATTArticle Von Freedom of Transit
Article 11 provisions covered freedom of transit. This Article
provided a definition of "traffic in transit," sets out a basic freedom of
transit rule. 177 It obligated WTO Members to provide non-
discriminatory treatment (that is, both national and MFN treatment) to
traffic in transit and ensured they do not apply restrictions on freedom
of transit that would be "a disguised restriction on trade."178
Article 11 also clarified that GATT Article V does not obligate a
Member to build infrastructure to facilitate the transit of goods, or to
170. Id. art. 10, para. 2.4.
171. Id. art. 10, para. 2.1.
172. Id. art. 10, para. 3.1.
173. Id. art. 10, para. 4.1.
174. Id. art. 10, paras. 5.1, 6.1.
175. Id. art. 10, para. 7.1.
176. Id. art. 10, para. 10.
177. Id. art. 11.
178. Id. art. 11, para. 4.
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provide access to such infrastructure that it does have unless it opens
those facilities for general use by third parties. 179
Pursuant to GATT Article V, any regulations, formalities, or
charges affecting traffic in transit must not be "more restrictive . . .
than necessary," with the possible additional caveat that they must
"fulfill a legitimate objective." 180 Further, consideration must be given
to "less restrictive" alternative measures, and existing measures must
not be "a disguised restriction on transit traffic." 181 Article 11 also
imposed disciplines on fees, formalities, and documentation
requirements imposed in respect of traffic in transit, including
exemptions from customs duties imposed on imported merchandise as
well as exemptions from compliance with technical standards.182
Advance filing and processing of transit documentation, prior to arrival
and trans-shipment, would be mandatory. 183
Finally, Article 11 also ensured that once transited goods have
undergone the relevant procedures, they must be allowed to exit the
relevant customs territory without delay.18 4 There was a bar on the use
of customs convoys except for high-risk goods.185 There were disciplines
on bonded transport regimes and guarantees, to avoid inland diversion
of goods in transit.186
* Final Provisions
Article 12 concerned customs cooperation among WTO Members.' 8 7
It called for, inter alia, the exchange of information and assistance on
imported and exported merchandise, on traffic in transit, and on
verification of declarations made by traders. But, Members did not
reach consensus on the extent to which some of the proposed rules
would be mandatory versus exhortative.188
Article 13 discussed institutional arrangements, including the
establishment of a WTO Committee on Trade Facilitation.18 9 Article 14
required Members to establish a national Committee on Trade
179. Id. art. 11, para. 1 bis.
180. Id. art. 11, paras. 3, 9.
181. Id. art. 11, paras. 3(b)-(c).
182. Id. art. 11, paras. 7, 10.
183. Id. art. 11, para. 11.
184. Id. art. 11, paras. 12-15.
185. Id. art. 11, para. 17.
186. Id. art. 11, paras. 15-16.
187. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
188. See id. art. 12, paras. 1, 4.
189. See id. art, 13, para. 1.1.
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Facilitation. Its goal is to "facilitate the process of domestic
coordination of trade facilitation matters." 190
Article 15 contained special provisions for small, vulnerable
economies ("SVEs") that are members of a CU or FTA. They may adopt
regional approaches to implementing their trade facilitation
obligations.191 Also, all of the obligations in the Draft Text would be
subject to the exceptions in GATT Articles XX and XXI. 192
* S & D Treatment
Part II of the Draft Text contained transitional provisions for
developing and least developed countries. Paragraph 1 explicitly
acknowledged the differences among these countries, and it stated that
S & D treatment "should extend beyond the granting of traditional
transition periods for implementing commitments" and relate the
"extent and the timing of entering commitments" to "the
implementation capacities of developing and least developed country
Members." 193 None of them would be compelled to make infrastructure
investments beyond their means, and least developed countries would
have only to undertake commitments commensurate with their specific
development, financial, and trade needs, "or their administrative and
institutional capabilities." 19 4  Conversely, developed countries "shall
ensure to provide support and assistance" to poor countries so they
could implement their obligations.195 Absent such funding, or absent
the requisite capacity, poor countries would not have to fulfill their
duties.1 9 6  But, commitment of support and assistance from rich
countries would be "not open ended."1 97
Overall, Paragraph 1 contained bracketed language that is
politically correct, designed not to offend any Member. On the one
hand, it set out general principles that favor poor countries. On the
other hand, it did not guarantee them any specific funding from rich
countries. This equivocation was troubling, because trade facilitation is
rightly touted as a way to help poor countries, whether Islamic or not:
they can participate more effectively in the global trading system
through more efficient customs clearance processes. Market access
gains from tariff and subsidy cuts are not realizable if trade cannot flow
because of cumbersome or corrupt procedures for classification,
190. See id. art, 14, para. 1.1.
191. Id. art. 15, para. 1.1.
192. Id. art. 15, para. 1.3.
193. Id. § II, para. 1.2.
194. Id. § II, paras. 1.2-1.3.
195. Id. § II, para. 1.4.
196. Id. § II, para. 1.4.
197. Id. § II, para. 1.5.
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valuation, and inspection. They also are unrealizable if port and
related infrastructure is parlous. Yet, on providing financial assistance
to poor countries to help them implement trade facilitation
commitments, the Members (in the words of a trade diplomat) had "very
significant and fundamental" differences. 198
Equally troubling was another fact: having stated implementation
periods are not the only type of S & D treatment for poor countries, the
Members, in the rest of Section II, focus on only this type. This
hypocrisy was evident in Paragraphs 2 through 8 of the Draft Text.
They group commitments for developing and least developed countries
on trade facilitation into three categories - A, B, and C - with different
implementation periods for the duties in each category:199
1)Category A commitments would be legally binding upon the
entry into force of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. 200
2) Category B commitments would allow for a transitional
period, but that period is undefined, which do not require
any technical assistance or capacity building. 201
3) Category C commitments would require technical
assistance or capacity building, and, therefore, additional
time for implementation, though again the period is
undefined.202
Developing and least developed countries would have the right to
notify to the WTO the commitments they are putting in each Category,
i.e., categorization is self-determined. 2 0 3 Similarly, under Categories B
and C, developing and least developed countries could define for
themselves the implementation period for each self-imposed obligation,
or accept a default time of one year.204 To be sure, Members did not
agree on that default time or on how much time after entry into force of
a Trade Facilitation Agreement a poor country would have to notify the
WTO of its obligations. 205
Flexibilities existed for a developing or least developed country that
faced difficulties implementing obligations in a timely fashion. Upon
198. Quoted in Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Warns Members Not to Get Stuck on
'Deliverables'Package, Says LDCs Priority, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 886 (June 2, 2011).
199. See Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, supra note 4, § II, paras. 2.1-2.3.
200. Id. § II, para. 2.1.
201. Id. § II, para. 2.2.
202. Id. § II, paras. 2.3, 5.3.
203. Id. § II, para. 2.4.
204. Id. § II, para. 4.2(a) (explaining that commitments would take effect at the end of
the expiry of the time period for notifying the WTO about the commitment and its
implementation); see id. art. 8.
205. See id. § II, paras. 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.1 bis.
286 VOL. 40:1-3
DEBACLE OF DOHA ROUND COUNTER-TERRORISM
notification to the WTO of such difficulties (a so-called "Early Warning
Mechanism"), developed country Members would cooperate to help the
country overcome the difficulties, including via an extension of the
deadline. 206 Possibly, an extension of up to a year would be provided
automatically upon notice. 207 Developing and least developed countries
also would have the option to shift an obligation from one Category to
another, most likely from B to C.208
Further, there were three "Peace Clauses." The first one ensured
WTO Members do not bring legal claims under GATT Article XXIII or
WTO dispute settlement procedures against developing or least
developed countries for a grace period of two years following the entry
into force of a Trade Facilitation Agreement. 209  The second one
immunized developing and least developing countries from suit in
respect of a Category B or C commitment for two years following
implementation of that commitment. 210 However, Members did not
agree on the two year period (after all, it was in bracketed text), nor had
they decided whether a different period should apply in the second
Peace Clause to least developed countries. 211 The third clause, for the
benefit of least developed but not developing countries, barred suit
against such countries for an unspecified number of years as regards
their Category A commitments. 212 In all instances, developed countries
would be obligated to "'exercise due restraint" in bringing up a matter
for consultations, or adjudication, with a developing or least developed
country. 213
Finally, and to be fair to the Draft Text, there was a new dimension
to S & D treatment, one going beyond deferral of implementation
periods. Article 9 said:
[9.1 The provision of technical assistance and capacity
building by developed country Members and relevant
international organizations and other agencies of
cooperation, including the IMF [International Monetary
Fund], OECD, UNCTAD [United Nations Commission on
Trade and Development], WCO and the World Bank, is a
precondition for the acquisition of implementation capacity
206. Id. § II, paras. 4.2(c), 6.1-6.4, 6.1 bis-6.3 bis.
207. Id. § II, para. 6.2.
208. Id. § II, paras. 4.3, 6.1 bis-6.3 bis.
209. Id. § II, para. 7.1.
210. Id. § II, para. 7.2.
211. See id. § II, paras. 7.1-7.2, 7.7.
212. Id. § II, para. 7.6.
213. Id. § II, para. 7.8.
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by developing country and least-developed country
Members in respect of provisions requiring assistance.]
[9.2 In cases where technical assistance and capacity
building is not provided or lacks the requisite effectiveness,
developing country and least-developed country Members
are not bound to implement the provisions notified under
Category C.]214
In other words, unlike any other provision in the GATT-WTO
regime, legal obligations of poor countries are explicitly contingent on
rich countries helping them with the means to fulfill those obligations.
Why flog a poor country for failure to meet its duties when it could not
possibly do so without assistance? Additionally, Article 10 of the Draft
Text obligates developed countries to report to the WTO on the
technical and financial assistance, and capacity building measures, they
provide to poor countries. 215
Unfortunately, the relevant text (quoted above) is bracketed.
Moreover, how exactly a legal claim might be brought under Article
9.19.-2 is unclear. Suppose a developed country accuses a developing or
least developed country of failure to implement a Category C
commitment. The developing or least developed country respondent
counters that the developed country complainant failed to provide the
requisite technical assistance for capacity building, or did not do so
effectively. What evidence must the respondent adduce for this defense
to be successful? An abject failure to provide any help might be
sufficient. But, could the developed country rebut that evidence by
arguing no assistance was needed to implement the particular
obligation at issue, or by contending it provided help but it was wasted
owing to corruption in the government of the respondent? Perhaps the
developed country could argue there is no "hard law" obligation for it to
provide assistance, citing Article 9.3, which states:
9.3 [Developed country Members and developing
country Members in a position to do so] [Members] agree to
facilitate the provision of technical assistance[, financial
assistance] and capacity building to developing country and
least-developed country Members, on mutually agreed
terms and either bilaterally or through the appropriate
international organizations. The objective of such
assistance is to assist developing country and least-
214. Id. § II, paras. 9.1-9.2 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
215. Id. § II, para. 10.1.
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developed country Members to comply with the
Agreement's commitments. 216
To "agree to facilitate" is not the same as a mandate to commit
funds and expertise, and in any event, such agreement is contingent on
the "mutual agreement" of the developing or least developed country.
Moreover, perhaps providing normal budgetary contributions to the
appropriate international organization, such as the World Bank, fulfills
Article 9.3. Certainly, Article 9.4 lays out principles for providing
technical assistance and capacity building, exhorting developed
countries to take account, inter alia, of the development framework of
the recipient, regional integration, and private sector activities. 217 But,
the listed principles are generic, and might easily expand rather than
narrow the grounds for dispute between rich and poor countries.
C. What Should Have Happened
Without doubt, the April 2011 Draft Text on Trade Facilitation
provided considerable detail on the basic GATT Article V, VII, and X
obligations and helps resolve contemporary customs problems. But,
WTO Members failed to reach agreement on a vast array of critical
issues. The Text contained 850 brackets. That is, there were 850 trade
facilitation areas in which the Members, after a decade of negotiations,
had not reached consensus. 218 Complicating matters further was the
fact many brackets were set within other brackets, i.e., the document
had bracketed text within bracketed text.
To some degree, the range and depth of disagreement was puzzling.
Trade facilitation ought to be an area in which free traders and
development champions can reach agreement. Both groups seek
increased trade, and cutting red tape achieves that result. Thus,
assuming agreement could be reached on the bracketed language, the
Draft Text promised to have a significant, positive effect on trade
facilitation. The problem was an agreement was not at hand.
At the same time, helpful as streamlining customs clearance
procedures could be to generating trade, boosting economic growth, and
alleviating poverty in poor countries, and in turn, to rendering poor
people in those countries less susceptible to Islamist or other extremist
ideologies, a caveat should be noted. The poor should not be blamed for
their poverty, if for no other reason than to do so is uncharitable (and
very much un-Christian). That is, some developed country officials
216. Id. § II, para. 9.3 (emphasis added).
217. See id. § II, para. 9.4(a)-(c).
218. See Pruzin, U.S. Criticizes WTO Chief Lamy's Assessment of Doha Impasse, Says
NAMA Not Only Issue, supra note 86.
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have the view that if a trade facilitation deal is agreed, then most of the
development-oriented work of the Doha Round is complete, and the
focus of the rest of the Round can be on market access. Rich countries
should not so easily absolve themselves of their responsibilities to poor
countries. Charity aside, they would do well to bear in mind they share
a long-term national security interest in addressing poverty and the
sense of marginalization or oppression felt among some Muslim
communities.
IV. THE MISSING MIDDLE "D" IN THE DDA
A. Why Not .. .?
If the Doha Round is not about true free trade, or aggressive trade
liberalization, then is it about the middle "D" in the acronym DDA?
That is, is the Round about development, specifically about fighting
poverty in the Third World? The question became all the more acute
during the Round. As trade negotiators fiddled with and quibbled over
mind-numbing details, the number of chronically hungry people in the
world rose from 848 million in 2003-2005 to nearly one billion
(specifically, 963 million) in 2008.219 The United Nations Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) of halving world hunger between 1990 and
2015 was further off than ever before. 220
"No" is the response to the above question. Why not, as the U.S.
urges in the first and second trade agenda report of the Obama
Administration (the 2009 Trade Policy Agenda and 2008 Annual
Report, and 2010 Trade Policy Agenda and 2009 Annual Report),221 and
at every other opportunity, demand a correction of the "imbalance" in
the Doha Round negotiations between:
1) a known, calculable value of America's concessions
(including cuts to farm subsidies); and
2) a value of new market access opportunities from other
countries for America's farmers, ranchers, manufacturers,
and service providers, which is unclear because of special
flexibilities, not the least of which is the special safeguard
mechanism ("SSM") for agricultural products? 222
219. Javier Blas, Almost lbn People Now Going Hungry, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008.
220. See DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, 296-97 (presenting
an overview of the MDGs).
221. OFF. OF U.S TRADE REP., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 2009 TRADE POL'Y
AGENDA AND 2008 ANN. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U. S. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM pt. 1, at 3, pt. 2, at 3 (2009); OFF. OF U.S TRADE REP., EXEC. OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE 2010 TRADE POL'Y AGENDA AND 2009 ANN. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE U. S. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM pt. 1, at 4 (2010).
222. See also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Endorse Work Plan to Secure Doha
Agreement in 2011, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Dec. 2, 2010) (quoting U.S.
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Why not, as the USTR professes, focus on winning for the American
people market-opening concessions from foreign governments, make it
clear that "no deal is better than a bad deal," and declaim that America
Ambassador to the WTO Michael Punke saying, "What is not realistic is the notion that a
few of the world's most powerful trading nations [e.g., Brazil, China, and India] can play
by a set of rules that gives them largely unfettered access to global markets - without
giving appropriate reciprocity in return"); Daniel Pruzin, Deputy USTR Punke Cites
Commitment to Successful Conclusion of Doha Round, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 658
(May 6, 2010) (reporting "[t]he United States has been pinned with the blame for holding
up the Doha talks by some delegations, who say Washington is insisting on additional
market access conditions from some WTO Members - in particular . Brazil, China and
India - without making it clear what it wants and without offering tradeoffs to secure the
concessions," and "U.S. officials for their part insist that the special provisions for
developing countries written into draft negotiating texts on agriculture and industrial
tariffs mean the major emerging markets could secure additional access to the U.S.
market while offering little or any additional market access on their end," thus "the Doha
agreement as spelled out in the draft text[s] stand little chance of securing support either
from the U.S. Congress or the U.S. business community."); Rossella Brevetti,
Administration's 2010 Trade Agenda Warns Against Weak Doha Round Pact, 27 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 290 (Mar. 4, 2010) (laying out the policy of the Obama Administration
on the Doha Round); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Expected to Come Under Pressure at WTO
Ministerial Over Doha Trade Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1604 (Nov. 26, 2009)
(reporting on the confirmation hearing before the Senate Finance Committee of Michael
Punke to be the U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, at which he said "the concessions made by
the U.S. were 'very clear,' but 'what's unclear is what we're going to receive in return."');
Doug Palmer, U.S. Warns "Imbalance" in Doha Talks Needs Fixing, REUTERS, Mar. 2,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/02/us-obama-trade-
idUSTRE5215RU20090302. (quoting from the 2009 Trade Policy Agenda); Joe Kirwin,
Kirk Rejects Complaints About U.S. Position by EU on Doha Talks, DOD's Tanker
Bidding, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 462 (Apr. 1, 2010) (quoting USTR Ambassador Ron
Kirk, in advance of a meeting with new European Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht,
that in light of the massive American trade deficit, claims that the U.S. was protectionist
are "laughable," and restating the American position that Brazil, China, and India must
open their markets to U.S. agricultural, manufacturing, and financial services products);
Daniel Pruzin, Officials Downbeat After U.S., India, Brazil Talks in Paris on Doha
Round, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1381 (Oct. 15, 2009) (reporting Brazil and India insisted
the U.S. -start showing its cards," while the U.S. demanded "greater clarity in regards to
the developing country flexibilities," and quoting an unnamed trade diplomat as saying "I
don't think they're [the Doha Round talks among the three countries] going anywhere");
Daniel Pruzin, G-20 Trade Diplomats See Positive Outcome from Summit, but Business
Groups Skeptical, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1311 (Oct. 1, 2009) (paraphrasing Acting U.S.
Ambassador to the WTO, David Shark, that "the United States knows what concessions it
will have to make on agriculture and industrial tariffs under the draft texts now on the
table," and quoting him as saying it is "still not sufficiently clear what the others will be
doing"); Tripti Lahiri, New Delhi 'Breakthrough' Sets Restart of Doha Round Ag, NAMA
Talks for Sept. 14, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1191 (Sept. 10, 2009); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S.
Says No WTO Deal Possible Until Other Countries Improve Their Offers, 26 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 304 (Mar. 5, 2009). The U.S. is not alone in pushing for greater concessions by
poor countries on market access for goods and services. BusinessEurope urged the EU to
adopt the same stance as the U.S. Daniel Pruzin, Business Group Pushes EU to Press for
Access Gains in Emerging Markets, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1068 (July 15, 2010).
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will not be "shamed" into accepting a Doha Round package that
generates insufficient export opportunities? 223
After all, 95 percent of the world's consumers reside outside the
U.S., so it is keenly in America's economic interest to have free-trade
access to them. Yet, endless flexibilities for developing countries in the
draft Doha Round texts would allow those countries to wall off their
consumers from American products. Looking at the December 2008
Draft NAMA Text, the former USTR, Ambassador Susan Schwab,
complained:
What are the relative roles and responsibilities of
advanced (or developed), emerging, and developing
countries?
For manufactured goods, these proposals would, by the
end of the Doha Round implementation period, allow the
tariffs of most emerging economies, other than China and
South Africa, to remain largely unchanged from those in
place when the Doha Round began. Based on 2008
calculations, this would result in the developed economies'
delivering over three-quarters of the Doha Round's market-
opening results, well beyond their current 53 percent (and
shrinking) share of global GDP.224
Likewise, said Deputy USTR and Ambassador to the WTO, Michael
Punke, in June 2010:
It [the flexibility for developing countries to exclude
tariff lines from agreed-upon formulaic cuts, along with
extended implementation periods, for them] means that
China could shelter its entire automobile sector from any
market opening. It means China could shield broad parts
of its chemical sector from market opening. It means
Brazil could leave in place over a thousand tariff peaks.
It means India ... could avoid making cuts in applied
tariffs on 97 percent of its industrial tariffs. . . . When you
223. Daniel Pruzin, Kirk Says U.S. Will Not be 'Shamed' into Accepting Inadequate
Doha Deal, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1684 (Dec. 10, 2009) (quoting USTR Ambassador
Ron Kirk); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Still Needs More Time to Decide Next Steps in WTO
Trade Talks, Punke Says, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1529 (Nov. 12, 2009) (reporting on
the confirmation hearings before the Senate Finance Committee of Michael Punke to be
U.S. Ambassador to the WTO).
224. Schwab, supra note 137, at 104, 109-10 (emphasis added).
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think about examples like that, I think it's not surprising
that we don't believe what's currently on the table is
sufficiently ambitious or balanced, particularly when you
contrast that with what's being asked of the U.S. We're
being asked to make cuts to 100 percent of our applied
tariffs. If what's on the table were implemented, the
average U.S. tariff rate would be cut from 3.9 percent to 1.9
percent. If you look at the trade-weighted tariff, the U.S.
would end up with an average tariff of 0.7 percent. 225
Never mind the fact a 3.9 percent duty rate is a nuisance tariff, so a
cut to 1.9 percent makes little economic difference in terms of protective
effect. Never mind also the fact that America accounts for 12 percent of
global trade, down from over one-quarter in the 1980s. 2 26 It is not that
America has become weaker or failed to export more. Rather, from the
perspective of the USTR, it is that the proverbial global economic "pie"
is getting bigger, and - amidst new power relationships in an arguably
multi-polar world economic system - America wants a larger slice.
As Ambassador Punke put it in November 2010:
The central question that remains is whether or not
the emerging economies are ready to step up to a level of
responsibility that's commensurate with their role in the
global economy.227
This refrain was repeated nearly verbatim, and ad nauseum,
evincing just how hardened positions had become. In January 2011,
Ambassador Punke stated:
The central question of the [Doha] Round ... remains
the question of whether emerging economies are prepared
to accept the responsibility that comes along with their
position in the global economy. If they're prepared to accept
that responsibility, we'll have a successful outcome. 228
225. Daniel Pruzin, Punke Says U.S. Frustrated by Talks with Brazil, China, India on
Doha Tariffs, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 973 (July 1, 2010).
226. Len Bracken, WTO Official Describes Doha Round Negotiations as Test for U.S.
Leadership, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 776 (May 27, 2010).
227. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Ambassador Punke Cites Importance of Upcoming Talks to
Advance Doha Round, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1914 (Dec. 16, 2010) (emphasis added).
228. Daniel Pruzin, Punke Cites Disappointment with Initial U.S. - China Talks on
Advancing Doha Round, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 76 (Jan. 20, 2011).
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In July 2011, he intoned:
[F]rankly, if [the] Doha [Round] could be completed by
virtue of throwing a pile of concessions on the table, we
would have had a deal many years ago. [The goal of the
Obama Administration is] not just any deal - but a good
deal [indicative of new global economic realities]. . . .
Wishing this complexity away with empty exhortations - or
calls for unilateral concessions - will not result in
success.229
The position clearly was one of maximizing America's slice in a pie
that was growing because of Brazil, China, India, and other enlarging
markets, not one of ensuring that poor countries with marginalized
Muslim youths got a bigger or fairer slice.
Consistent with this position, Ambassador Punke characterized his
December 2010 meeting with Chinese Commerce Minister Chen
Deming as "somewhat disappointing," as China failed to spell out
detailed tariff cuts it was willing to make, and stuck to its position that
participation in NAMVIA sectoral negotiations must be voluntary. 230
Likewise, the American Ambassador lambasted the new Brazilian
government for raising import duties, indeed, the Common External
Tariff ("CET") of MERCOSUR, from 20 to 35 percent on toys to protect
Brazilian, Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan toy companies from
Chinese producer-exporters. It was a "stick in the eye to Brazil's
trading partners, and it creates a more difficult environment for the
Doha negotiations," said the Ambassador. 231 The new government
picked up where its predecessor left off, as Brazil had raised tariffs in
2009 and 2010 on autos, auto parts, chemicals, electronics, plastics, and
textile and apparel ("T & A") items. The U.S. castigated Brazil for the
large gap between its bound and applied average duty rates - the
"water" in its tariff schedule: 31.4 versus 11.6 percent. 232
Following, or better yet composing the same refrain, issuance of the
April 2011 Documents, eight major American business groups - the
229. Rossella Brevetti, World Bank President Zoellick Blasts U.S. 'Defensive' Position
in Doha Round, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1203 (July 21, 2011).
230. Pruzin, Punke Cites Disappointment with Initial U.S. - China Talks on
Advancing Doha Round, supra note 228.
231. Id.
232. Timothy C. Brightbill, NTE Identifies Trade Barriers in More than 60 Countries,
as Well as Some Hard Truths About the WTO's Doha Round, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
834 (May 19, 2011) (recounting statistics presented in the twenty-sixth annual National
Trade Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers, published by the USTR on Mar. 30, 2011).
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American Farm Bureau Federation, Business Roundtable, Coalition of
Services Industries, Emergency Committee for Foreign Trade, National
Association of Manufactures ("NAM"), National Foreign Trade Council,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. Council for International
Business - intoned in a joint statement that:
A trade round is about opening markets and setting
the rules for world trade for decades so it must address the
reality that all major developed and advanced developing
WTO members that have benefitted from past rounds
enormously have a responsibility to the world trading
system to undertake significant market opening measures .
. . It is clear that this is not happening. 233
In July 2011, the NAM Vice President for International Economic
Affairs, Frank Vargo, intoned that:
[a]bout 70 percent of all the duties on American
manufacturers' exports are assessed by a relatively small
handful of the advanced developing countries. .. And about
70 percent of the duties that the least developed countries
pay are paid to the same countries. 234
The first point relied on a distinction favored among American
protectionists, between better- and worse-off developing countries. The
distinction is dubious because the ostensibly better-off ones, like Brazil
and India, are home to hideously high numbers of desperately poor
people. 235 The second point correctly recounted a long-standing concern
about barriers to trade among poor countries (South - South trade). 236
But, it presumed that least developed countries have much in the way
of industrial products to export, and ignored the infant industry
concerns of many poor country manufacturers.
Manifestly from such comments, the Doha Round was far adrift
from the vision on which it was founded: development, through trade
liberalization, as a counter-terrorism strategy. A decade on, the Round
233. Len Bracken, Eight Industry Groups React to Deadlock on Doha, Back
Administration on Problems, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 728 (May 5, 2011).
234. Len Bracken, Business Representatives Explore Ways to Liberalize Trade as Doha
Round Falters, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1274 (Aug. 4, 2011).
235. See CIA, THE WORLD FACT BOOK: POPULATION BELOW POVERTY LINE,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2046.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2011).
236. Bracken, supra note 234.
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was about re-balancing rights and obligations in the world trading
system, namely, fewer rights and more obligations for big developing
countries. American policy no longer linked gains from free trade with
defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Rather, the policy was to compel
Brazil, China, and India to realize they could not have it both ways: (1)
being classified as developing countries and continuing their anti-
American trade policies, and (2) demanding the respect and status of
major powers without shouldering the attendant obligations and
burdens. 237 "Grow up" was the American response.
To be fair, from a commercial perspective, the American response
was justifiable. It was backed by a bevy of data on agriculture. For
example, India has among the highest average bound tariff rates on
agricultural goods in the world (as of December 2009) - 114 percent. 238
Some of India's bound farm tariffs are at 300 percent.239 Since 1991,
when India introduced economic liberalization reforms, it dropped its
average applied agricultural tariffs notably, from 113 percent in that
year to 34 percent in 2007.240 But, 34 percent still is among the highest
average applied rates on farm goods in the world, and India slapped
especially high tariffs on apples, chocolate, cookies, coffee, grapes,
potatoes, and poultry. 241 Small wonder that (as of 2008) American
agricultural exports amount to just six percent of the Indian import
market, and overall, farm imports supply only three percent of Indian
demand. Small wonder, then, why former USTR, Ambassador Susan
Schwab criticized the December 2008 Draft Agriculture text: it "would
allow India to shield close to 90 percent of its current agricultural trade
from tariff cuts . . ."242
Likewise, data on industrial product trade exist to support the
American perspective. For instance, the U.S. grants duty-free treatment
on agricultural and construction machinery, whereas China does not.
Since 2000 (and up through 2009), Chinese exports of this equipment
grew by 45 percent. 243 The U.S. also grants duty-free treatment to
237. See Bradley S. Klapper, With a 'short window,' one more try for deal on world
trade talks- Business- International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/14/business/worldbusiness/14iht-wto.3535749.html.
238. Amy Tsui, Baucus, Grassley Call for Access to Indian Agricultural Market as ITC
Report Released, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1774 (Dec. 24, 2009).
239. Brightbill, supra note 232.
240. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PUBL'N NO. 4107, INDIA: EFFECTS OF TARIFFS
AND NONTARIFF MEASURES ON U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 5-4 (2009), available at
www.usite.gov/publications/332/pub4107.pdf.
241. Brightbill, supra note 232.
242. Schwab, supra note 137, at 104, 110 (criticizing the draft because it would also
"permit China to exclude from the cuts commodities of keen interest to both developing
and developed countries, including corn, cotton, sugar, rice, and wheat.").
243. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Envoy Hears Positive Tone on Doha, But Actual Negotiations
Are Still Missing, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1757 (Nov. 18, 2010).
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medical equipment imports, but China does not. Since 2005 (up
through 2009), Chinese exports of these products doubled. 244 Plainly,
the U.S. said, China was internationally competitive in these markets.
Hence, it should drop its tariff barriers to zero on them. As for India,
since the Doha Round negotiations began in November 2001, it had
reduced its peak industrial tariffs from 35 to 10 percent. 245 Yet, 10
percent was higher than necessary to protect increasingly world-class
Indian exports, and it still maintained high tariffs on autos,
motorcycles, and textiles. 246 America saw a lot of "water" in India's
tariff schedule: an average bound rate of 48.6 percent contrasted with
an average applied rate of 12.9 percent. 247
Further rhetorical questions were the American response to the
question about the middle "D" in "DDA." Why not, as some in Congress
demand, amend American law to require the USTR to stick strictly to
reciprocity, forbidding it to agree to a tariff concession unless it secured
the elimination of foreign tariff and non-tariff barriers? 248 Why not, as
the American business lobby insists, demand a balance among
agriculture, NAMA, and services opportunities, and greater ambition in
all three areas, plus strong trade remedy rules, rather than allow other
WTO Members to focus on the farm sector?249 Why not, as American
agricultural interests intone, obtain commercially meaningful market
access for U.S. farm products, especially in light of the severe
concessions the U.S. is being asked to make in respect of domestic
support and export competition?250 Why not, then, reject any attempt
to reap an "early harvest" of separate agreements on particular issues,
rather than await a comprehensive single undertaking?2 51
244. Id.
245. Nayanima Basu, Officials Lose Hope of Wrapping Up Doha Round by 2010, Bus.
STANDARD (India), Feb. 14 2010, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/officials-
lose-hopewrappingdoha-round-by-20 10/385623/.
246. Brightbill, supra note 232.
247. Id.
248. See Amy Tsui, Brown-Slaughter Bill Would Require USTR to Eliminate Barriers
before Cutting Tariffs, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1386 (Oct. 15, 2009) (reporting that a
legislative proposal - the Reciprocal Market Access Act - was introduced to Congress in
October 2009 that would establish authority to enforce a reciprocal bargain by raising
American tariffs if a foreign government reneged on its promise to cut its tariff or non-
tariff barriers).
249. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Business, Farm Groups Urge Obama to Reassess
Approach to WTO Trade Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 308 (Mar. 5, 2009); Amy Tsui,
NAM Issues Economic Recovery Agenda to Congress Calling for Open Markets, 26 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 314 (Mar. 5, 2009).
250. See Yerkey, U.S. Still Needs More Time, supra note 223.
251. See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Nominee Rejects 'Early Harvest' of Agreements in
WTO Trade Negotiations, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 372 (Mar. 19, 2009).
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B. Because ...
Indubitably, each of these questions is reasonable on the
assumption the paradigm for the Doha Round is reciprocity, not
generosity. From the American perspective, reciprocity is, and should
be, the paradigm. In his first State of the Union Address, in January
2010, President Barack H. Obama made that clear:
[Wie need to export more of our goods. (Applause.)
Because the more products we make and sell to other
countries, the more jobs we support right here in America.
(Applause.) So tonight, we set a new goal: We will double
our exports over the next five years, an increase that will
support two million jobs in America. (Applause.) To help
meet this goal, we're launching a National Export Initiative
that will help farmers and small businesses increase their
exports, and reform export controls consistent with
national security. (Applause.)
We have to seek new markets aggressively, just as our
competitors are. If America sits on the sidelines while
other nations sign trade deals, we will lose the chance to
create jobs on our shores. (Applause.) But realizing those
benefits also means enforcing those agreements so our
trading partners play by the rules. (Applause.) And that's
why we'll continue to shape a Doha trade agreement that
opens global markets.2 52
Critically, the National Export Initiative ("NEI") calls for doubling
American exports within 5 years. 253 There is no reference in the
President's address to poverty alleviation and its follow-on link to
combating the breeding grounds for Islamist extremism. The Doha
Round was about, or had turned into an exercise about, American
exports and jobs, period. Moreover, the U.S. assertion that it is willing
to offer additional concessions if only developing countries will improve
their market access offers in agricultural, industrial, and services trade
- an assertion made by President Obama at the November 2010 Seoul
G-20 Summit - is dubious. 254 Could the NEI goal of doubling exports be
achieved if America was not mercantilist in its position?
252. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-state-union-address) (emphasis added).
253. Id.
254. Daniel Pruzin, G-20 Leaders Say Time to Conclude Doha; Obama Prepared to
Take Risks for Approval, 27 Int'l Trade Rep (BNA) 1755 (Nov. 18, 2010).
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The American argument boils down to an assertion that difficulties
in the Doha Round are due to a standoff.2 5 5 On the one side is the U.S.,
which rightly demands greater market access in developing countries
for its agricultural and industrial products, and its financial services,
and seeks legitimization of its trade remedy methodologies, particularly
zeroing. To some degree, the U.S. is backed by other developed
countries, namely, Australia, which champions better market access for
agricultural and industrial products, and services. Notably, the U.S. is
not joined by the EU, which declared around 2009, and reiterated in
May 2010, that they had reached the limit of what they can offer and
will make no new concessions. 256 In that respect, the EU has succeeded
in painting the U.S. as the "bad guy" in the Round, with nearly
insatiable demands - at least in the minds of some participants and
observers.
On the other side are big emerging countries, particularly Brazil,
China, and India. They wrongly resist these demands, says the U.S.,
and thereby fail to shoulder greater responsibilities in the world trading
system, despite their professed desire to be major players in this
system. Thus, when in November 2009 former Deputy USTR Peter
Allgeier suggested a three-pronged compromise to break the impasse:
1) Brazil, China, and India forgo any exceptions to agreed
upon NAMA tariff cuts and any right to make no cuts on
Special Products;
2) the U.S. abandon its zeroing methodology in calculating
dumping margins; and
3) the EU drop its proposal to extend the higher degree of
protection afforded in TRIPs Article 23 to wine and spirits
to a broad range of other geographically indicated items. 257
The idea was reasonable. But, it was firmly rooted in a paradigm
of reciprocity between rich and poor countries, not generosity of the rich
toward the poor. Unsurprisingly, it went largely unnoticed. The likes
of Brazil, China, and India stuck to the position that the U.S. must back
down from its manifestly excessive demands as well as its failure to
indicate what it would offer if they actually did cough up a few more
concessions.
255. Yerkey, U.S. Expected to Come Under Pressure at WTO Ministerial Over Doha
Trade Talks, supra note 222.
256. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Told to Tone Down Demands If Doha Round Deal to be
Concluded, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 775 (May 27, 2010).
257. Yerkey, U.S. Expected to Come Under Pressure at WTO Ministerial Over Doha
Trade Talks, supra note 222.
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C. Trade Deficits and China
China's position hardened because of Federal Reserve monetary
policy. 25 8 The U.S. was flooding the world with dollars, as evidenced by
the November 2010 Federal Reserve decision to commence a second
round of quantitative easing by buying $600 billion of Treasury
securities. In foreign exchange markets, dollar depreciation was the
consequence of such easing, which in turn meant countries with trade
surpluses were at risk of becoming countries with trade deficits.
For example, the dollar depreciated against the Brazilian real, and
Brazil experienced a $50 billion reversal in its merchandise trade
balance between 2007 and 2010.259 Predictably, Brazil announced in
December 2010 it was unlikely it could make further substantive Doha
Round trade concessions in view of its worsening trade balance. 260 The
15-percentage point increase in the MERCOSUR CET on toy tariffs
(mentioned above) was "due to their [American] own policy of devaluing
[sic] the dollar . . . [and besides,] U.S. products benefit more from the
declining dollar than Brazilian products benefit from the increase in
tariffs," argued Brazil's Ambassador to the WTO, Roberto Azevedo. 261
Exacerbating the problem, from the perspective of Brazil, was that
China was the largest source of cheap imports into Brazil - in part
because of the appreciation of the real relative to the Chinese yuan. 2 6 2
In July 2011, Brazil (specifically, its Minister of Finance, Guido
Mantega) not only spoke of "struggles between countries" over foreign
exchange valuations, but also said the global currency was "absolutely
not over." 2 63 True enough, low interest rates in developed countries
258. Daniel Pruzin, Brazilian Official Says U.S. Payment Expected for Further
Concessions in Doha, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1912 (Dec. 16, 2010); see, e.g., Joe Leahy,
Brazil's Soaring Currency Aggravates Problems for Rousseff Administration, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 2-3, 2011, at 1.
259. Pruzin, Brazilian Official Says U.S. Payment Expected for Further Concessions in
Doha, supra note 258.
260. Id. See also Daniel Pruzin, Trade Ministers Vow to Overcome Differences, Achieve
Doha Breakthrough, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 178 (Feb. 3, 2011) (reporting the new
Brazilian Foreign Minister, Antonio Patriota, stated Brazil had limited room to make
concessions because of the appreciation of the real relative to the dollar).
261. Pruzin, Punke Cites Disappointment with Initial U.S. - China Talks on
Advancing Doha Round, supra note 228.
262. Joe Leahy, Brazil and China Face Increase in Trade Tensions, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 31, 2011, at 1; Joe Leahy, Brazilian Factories Tested by Chinese Imports,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 31, 2011, at 6.
263. Chris Giles & John Paul Rathbone, Currency Wars "Not Over," FIN. TIMES
(London), July 6, 2011, at 1 (reporting that Brazilian interest rates were high because of
tight monetary policy, which it needed to prevent the Brazilian economy from
unsustainably high growth levels and to combat inflation). See also Brazil's Currency
War Wounds, FIN. TIMES (London), July 8, 2011, at 8 (reporting on the effect of currency
appreciation on the Brazilian economy).
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were partly to blame. With Brazil's main policy rate at 12.25 percent
that month, small wonder why financial investors sought to purchase
the real and thereby acquire Brazilian interest-bearing assets. 264
Yet, as a general matter, much reluctance by Brazil, India, and
other emerging markets and developing countries to reducing their
trade barriers through the Doha Round stemmed not from fear of
competition from the U.S., but from China. 26 5  Former USTR,
Ambassador Susan Schwab, explained that "fear of increased imports
from China may be the most unacknowledged reason behind Doha's
continued failures."26 6
The Vice-President of the Council of the Americas/Americas Society
put it well in a speech in March 2011:
It's not just production in Brazil that might be
impinged on by Chinese low-cost production sales, but also
Brazilian markets in Africa.
Now the United States isn't the only country or the
loudest country saying to the Chinese, "you've got to
change the value of your currency."
I can tell you the Chinese don't care about allegations
of human rights abuses. They don't care about labor in the
context of unionization. 2 6 7
Likewise, The Economist observed: [C]ountries like India and
Brazil are now more worried about cheap imports from China than
about imports from the rich world. In essence, they might be more
willing to open their markets to rich countries if doing so did not
simultaneously let in more Chinese goods.268
264. Giles & Rathbone, supra note 263.
265. Schwab, supra note 137, at 108. For example, at the April 2011 BRICS meeting
in Sanya, China, four of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa)
urged the fifth one (China) to import more products from them, and insisted that their
bilateral imbalances (with China) must be reduced. China retorted that its exchange rate
policy was not negotiable. Kathleen E. McLaughlin, Developing Countries' Leaders Push
China to Agree to Import More Products, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 647 (Apr. 21, 2011).
266. Schwab, supra note 137, at 108.
267. Amy Tsui, China's Interests in Brazil, Latin America Prompt Concerns About
'Deindustrialization,' 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 572 (Apr. 7, 2011) (quoting a March 28,
2011 speech by Eric Farnsworth to the National Foreign Trade Council).
268. Dead Man Talking, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2011, at 81 (emphasis added), available
at http://www.economist.com/node/18620814/comments.
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Of course, because of the MFN rule in GATT Article 1:1 and Article
11:1 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), doing so
does mean entry of more Chinese goods. And, the Deputy USTR and
Ambassador to the WTO, Michael Punke, summarized perfectly in June
2011:
I've been in many discussions with many different
Members of the WTO, and in our [U.S.'s] urging those other
Members to open their markets in the Doha context, one
thing I frequently hear is those Members telling me there's
no way we're going to open up on an MFN basis because
we're afraid of China . . . . China is an omnipresence in
these negotiations, in whatever room we're in, even if
China doesn't happen to be in the room. 269
In brief, it is not just that some WTO Members fear China. It is
that most of them greatly fear China.
Compounding the dilemma for the likes of Brazil and India are
three facts: the Chinese (1) are willing to invest in the infrastructure
(e.g., ports, roads, and railways) of the countries in which they gain
market access to facilitate their interests in those countries (e.g., using
them as an export platform); (2) typically import their own laborers,
who toil under sub-par labor and environmental standards; and (3) do
not operate under stringent anti-corruption standards. 270 Their model
of investment, then, is quite different from that of western
multinational corporations. That is, argues Farnsworth, the "Chinese
model of investment in the Western Hemisphere is for the mercantilist
purpose of spurring the Chinese economy and supporting the Chinese
communist government." 2 7 1 In brief, what help to Brazil or India would
a NAMA accord be if it helped Chinese more than their own
exporters? 272 The result would be de-industrialization in Brazil and
other Latin American countries, if not India, too.
269. Daniel Pruzin, Experts Say China Exerts Growing Influence, Generates Rising
Tensions in WTO Matters, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1135 (July 7, 2011) (emphasis
added).
270. Tsui, supra note 267.
271. Id.
272. See Len Bracken, Harbinson Sees Three Positive Indicators for Doha Conclusion;
Says U.S., China Key, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 299 (Feb. 24, 2011) (referencing a
statement by Bill Reinsch, President of the National Foreign Trade Council ("NFTC"),
that China might emerge as a big Doha Round winner on NAMA vis-A-vis Brazil and
India).
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D. Reciprocity and the Two-Track Approach
In May 2009, the above-posed questions prompted the newly
appointed USTR, Ambassador Ron Kirk, to advocate in favor of a
suggestion originating from Canada: negotiate direct, bilateral tariff
concessions on an individual, line-by-line basis first, using the
December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts as reference points for minimum
commitments, and thereafter conclude negotiations on the language of
the Texts themselves. 273 The idea ran counter to how multilateral trade
negotiations, including during those of the Uruguay Round, typically
are conducted: first secure a deal among all countries on modalities;
then enter into bilateral or small-group negotiations on specific tariff
cuts to individual tariff lines. Thus, Nestor Stancanelli, Ambassador to
the WTO from Argentina, remarked: "[p]ushing for bilaterals without
the modalities is crazy [and] [i]t just makes the process more complex
and difficult." 274 The proposed alternative, top-up approach would
allow the U.S. to deal directly with major developing countries like
Brazil, China, and India to ensure America had a clear indication of
what its agricultural and industrial product exporters could expect in
terms of new market access opportunities - before giving its final
judgment on a Doha Round deal.
That way, America could find out precisely how developing
countries intended to use the special rules - the flexibilities - drafted
for them, and thus ascertain what it would get in relation to what it
gave. In turn, the Congress, deeply skeptical of the effects on the
American economy of the Texts, might be more inclined to pass any
subsequent Doha Round deal. For instance, the U.S. could find out
from India exactly what farm products India intended to designate as
"special." Additionally, the U.S. could discern which countries would
participate in sectoral agreements (and the agreements they would
join). After all, said the USTR, an agreement on modalities was
supposed to be not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end,
namely, authentic trade liberalization. Moreover, the skepticism from
Congress was set in the wide context of a global economic recession, and
the President simply did not have fast-track trade negotiating authority
(which had expired on 30 June 2007).
Thus, the USTR had no choice but to propose that during the
remainder of 2009, WTO Members would prepare and circulate draft
schedules of tariff concessions, and in 2010 commence negotiations on
273. Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Cites Need for Two-Thack Approach for Concluding WTO's
Doha Round Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 696 (May 28, 2009); Daniel Pruzin, Kirk
Sees Need for New Approach to Doha, Indicates Retreat from Scheduling Proposal, 26 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 632 (May 14, 2009).
274. Daniel Pruzin, WTO 'Stocktaking' Meeting Starts on Pessimistic Note;
Expectations Lowered, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 412 (Mar. 25, 2010).
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tariff lines of keen interest. Those talks could wrap up in 2010, and a
final consensus on the Texts would follow shortly thereafter. For the
USTR, the Texts were too vague to accept, hence waiting for post-
modalities tariff schedules made no sense. To buttress this proposal,
the Obama Administration widened the context and "upped the ante."
What was at stake was nothing short of a new world economic order in
which imbalances in the global economy - not merely those in the Doha
Round texts - needed correcting. President Barack H. Obama bluntly
stated in September 2009, on the eve of the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh:
"We can't go back to the era where the Chinese or Germans or other
countries just are selling everything to us, we're taking out a bunch of
credit card debt or home equity loans, but we're not selling anything to
them."275
The statement itself is economically correct. Serious deficits run by
some countries, surpluses by others, and financing from the latter to
the former, is neither healthy nor sustainable in the long run. But, the
statement is irrelevant to the original aim of the Doha Round - namely,
that the Round be a key tool for development to wean countries and
peoples away from radicalism, and integrate them into the global
economy. The statement forgets this aim and establishes post hoc a
new goal for the Round, namely, structural adjustment. From an
American perspective, U.S. insistence on knowing the full value of
concessions developing countries will make, and how they will use their
flexibilities, before signing off on Doha Round texts, is sensible, because
the new American-established goal is to reduce its chronic trade deficit,
and concomitantly reduce the chronic trade surpluses of the likes of
China. But, this insistence translates into an unchanged trade policy:
the strategy of the Obama Administration for the Doha Round, like that
of the preceding Administration, is "no deal without tangible market
access gains in advanced developing countries." 276
As intimated, the obvious answer to this line of argument -
understandable as it may be from an American perspective - is that the
Doha Round never was supposed to produce a perfectly balanced
outcome. The middle "D" meant there would be a preferential option for
the poor. That is why, for instance, India insisted on the right to self-
select farm goods as "special" after modalities were agreed, at the time
each country prepared its Doha Round tariff schedule. 277 That also is
275. Alister Bull, U.S. to Push for New Economic World Order at G20, REUTERS, Sept.
21, 2009, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2009/09/21/us-
to-push-for-new-economic-world-order-at-g20/.
276. Daniel Pruzin, Continued Stalemate Set to Raise Questions About Future of Doha
Talks, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 83 (Jan. 21, 2010).
277. Pruzin, See Lamy Cites Need for Two-Track Approach for Concluding WTO's
Doha Round Talks, supra note 273.
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why China insisted that self-designation implies a developing country
does not have to publicize the list of goods it plans to shield from
agreed-upon cuts until after consensus has been reached on the overall
modalities Texts. 278 And, that is why South Africa argued it cannot do
more in terms of opening up its market to foreign competition, given
that it made concessions during the Uruguay Round that went far
beyond commitments made of less developed countries, and why it
found the December 2008 Draft Texts on Agriculture and NAMA
unacceptable - namely, they failed to address the "developmental
imbalance" between rich and poor countries. 279
Unfortunately, as the Third World began to take the middle "D"
seriously, claims came from the First World that it was a mistake to use
that middle "D." Doing so was a teaser, falsely raising expectations
among poor countries. "Why give hope to the poor?" was the cold,
sarcastic rhetorical question that hardheaded trade realists whispered
to each other. Thus, Argentina remarked (in respect of the December
2008 NAMA Text), "[i]t's a developed country agenda," because the
focus is on market access issues in which rich countries are
interested.280 Argentina also criticized the U.S. of flip-flopping: early on
in the Round, the U.S. agreed to modalities with flexibilities for
developing countries.
That was not the only answer to the American effort to flip the
order of events and put bilateral tariff schedules before the modalities
texts. First, Switzerland explained that the August 2004 Framework
Agreement contemplated bilateral negotiations on specific tariff
concessions, but only after modalities agreements were finalized. 281
Second, not all developed countries agreed with the U.S. Notably, the
EU opposed the approach suggested by the USTR. Commencing
bilateral negotiations before modalities were agreed could mean a re-
writing, even unraveling, of the December 2008 Texts, i.e., a loss of
years of hard work. 2 8 2 Third, and perhaps most importantly, developing
countries - including the entire G-20, led by Brazil, China, Egypt
(speaking for many African countries), and India - were steadfastly
against it. They suspected the U.S. wanted to engage them in bilateral
278. See Daniel Pruzin, Trade Ministers Meeting Calls for New Push to Move Doha
Round Before September G-20, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 872 (July 2, 2009).
279. Gary G. Yerkey, Finishing WTO Talks by End of 2010 Very Unlikely,' South
African Minister Says, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1313 (Oct. 1, 2009) (quoting Rob Davies,
South African Trade Minister, on Sept. 29, 2009).
280. Daniel Pruzin, NAMA Chair Outlines 'Gradual' Approach for Restarting Doha
Industrial Tariff Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 181 (Feb. 5, 2009) (quoting Argentina's
WTO ambassador Alfredo Dumont).
281. Pruzin, Kirk Sees Need for New Approach to Doha, Indicates Retreat from
Scheduling Proposal, supra note 273.
282. See id.
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talks because the U.S. would have greater leverage dealing with them
individually and even could exercise a divide-and-rule strategy. 283
Thus, the USTR had little choice but to beat a hasty retreat, with
one modest consolation. The Director-General, Pascal Lamy, said that
perhaps WTO Members could consider a two-track approach. Under it,
the Members could continue discussions on modalities, while
contemporaneously engaging in bilateral negotiations on cutting farm
tariffs and subsidies, reducing trade barriers to industrial products, and
clarifying the scope of flexibilities for poor countries. That is, the
Members could develop so-called "templates" whereby they would get
data from each other with a view to scheduling draft commitments
based on modalities formulas, and they could work on those modalities
formulas. There was irony in this consolation. Eight years into the
Doha Round, there was no clear consensus, much less unanimity, on
whether to proceed solely with modalities, commence bilaterals and
scheduling, or do both at once. The end-result, which was clear by
September 2009, was to do both at the same time. 2 8 4
This two-track approach is exactly the path some WTO Members
began to tread with the U.S. To be sure, the compromise language at
the July 2009 summit of G-8 leaders (i.e., from Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.) in
L'Aquila, Italy, which also was agreed to by Australia, Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia, Korea Mexico, and South Africa, was a fudge: "[Wie
regard enhancing the transparency and understanding of the [Doha
Round] negotiating results to date as a necessary means to facilitate the
conclusion of an agreement." 285
This language meant the U.S. was entitled to see how poor
countries intended to use their flexibilities under Doha Round texts,
and whether they would join a sectoral agreement, before agreeing to
those texts. Yet, poor countries insisted they would not bargain over
the precise products for which they sought special or sensitive
designation. Self-designation of those products might allow them to tell
the U.S. what they were going to do, as a matter of information, but
gave the U.S. no right of consultation, or negotiation, over what the
products would be, or whether they would join a sectoral agreement.
283. Id.
284. See Chair Consults on 'Energizing' Farm Talks for Coming Months, WTO (Sept.
16, 2009), http;//www.wto.org/English/news-e/agng_16sepO9-e.htm. The progress made
by WTO Members on developing templates is recounted in the April 2011 Agriculture
Document Part II, and on concomitant data-related activities in Part III. That Document
is discussed in Part One of the Trilogy.
285. Daniel Pruzin, G-8-Plus Declaration Sets Stage for Battle Over Developing
Country Flexibilities in Doha, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 950 (July 16, 2009) (quoting a
July 9, 2009 declaration by the G-8 and leaders of other major emerging economies).
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Not surprisingly, given the fuzzy compromise language and
increasingly entrenched positions, the two-track approach met with
mixed results. 286 On the margins of the Seventh WTO Ministerial
Conference in November - December 2009 in Geneva, the U.S. declared
it had "good" bilateral consultations with India. But, China was
unwilling to engage in bilateral talks with the U.S., particularly on
lowering its industrial tariffs on chemicals, electronic goods, and
machinery. China accused the U.S. of behaving in a protectionist
manner and unfairly subsidizing its farmers to the detriment of the
market access interests of Chinese farmers. The Chinese Vice
Agriculture Minister, Niu Dan, said he had no interest in talking with
the U.S. at the Conference, and added rather rudely "I don't have
time." 2 8 7 Brazil revealed the U.S. presented it with a list in early
October of 3,000 industrial tariff lines covering (inter alia) agricultural
and industrial machinery, chemicals, forestry products, medical devices,
and pharmaceuticals, for which the U.S. demanded tariff cuts beyond
the general NAMA formula reductions. 288
The U.S. argued Brazil, as well as China and India, is globally
competitive in these sectors, and thus ought to be willing to make
concessions. Yet, the U.S. neither identified for Brazil precisely how
many lines on which it ought to impose extra cuts, nor indicated the
priority lines. Brazil balked at the demand, complained that the U.S.
failed to state what concessions it would offer in return, and accused the
U.S. of making it as a tactic to delay completion of the Doha Round.
Brazil also reminded the U.S. that it and other developing countries
already had made significant market access concessions, thus the U.S.
had no basis for asking for yet more.289 The U.S. retorted that it should
not have to pre-pay for concessions from developing countries, as it
already had given up so much to arrive at the December 2008 Draft
Agriculture and NAMA texts. This dialectic continued throughout
2010, and into 2011.290
Not surprisingly, by late February 2010, there was widespread
pessimism the Doha Round could conclude in 2010.291 Positions had
286. See Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, Bilateral Talks on Possible WTO Deal Will
Continue for Months, USTR Says, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1671 (Dec. 3, 2009).
287. Id. (quoting Niu Dan on Nov. 29, 2009, on the eve of the WTO Ministerial
Conference).
288. Id; Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Trades Charges with China, Others Over Responsibility
for Doha Impasse, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1507 (Oct. 7, 2010).
289. Pruzin & Yerkey, Bilateral Talks on Possible WTO Deal Will Continue for
Months, USTR Says, supra note 286.
290. Pruzin, U.S. Trades Charges with China, Others Over Responsibility for Doha
Impasse, supra note 288.
291. Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Sees Low-Profile 'Stock-Taking' Meeting as Frustration Over
Doha Grows, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 248 (Feb. 25, 2010).
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hardened further, and on some topics, they even appeared to have
widened. Some WTO Members, and the Director-General, Pascal
Lamy, admitted they did not even know how big some of the key gaps
were. 2 9 2  The best choice seemed to be to press ahead with
contemporaneous bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and when
appropriate, pluri-lateral ones. After all, the alternatives were to
declare the Round dead, which no Member wanted openly to do, or to
suspend it indefinitely until the Members had the political will to finish
it. The conventional wisdom was that either alternative would deeply
injure the long-term credibility and even legitimacy of the WTO. In
truth, the world trading community might have appreciated the
honesty and integrity behind the alternatives. By the fall of 2010, it
was manifest that the Round would not finish by the end of 2010, and
probably not by the end of 2011. At the WTO, the U.S. on one side, and
Brazil, China, and India on the other, did little else than trade barbs as
to which side was to blame for the impasse. 293
E. Embarrassingly Protecting Self-Interest
As for the USTR retreat into accepting a two-track approach, it did
not mean the U.S., or developed countries generally, had a newfound
appreciation for the middle "D" in the DDA. The fact is that once
bargaining began in the Doha Round, especially in earnest after the
October 2005 Portman Proposal from the U.S.,294 the major powers
settled into a familiar theme: protecting their interests. They never did
shift away from that theme. Put differently, no satisfactory response
has emerged to the perspective long-held by Kamal Nath, India's
Minister of Commerce and Industry, namely, for India (and other poor
countries), lives are at stake, whereas for America (and other rich
countries), the only issue is commerce. 295 Thus, for example, in the
292. Lamy Calls for March Stocktaking to "Inject Political Energy and Momentum" in
the Negotiations, WTO (Feb. 22-23, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/newsl0
e/tncchair report 22febl0 e.htm.
293. Pruzin, U.S. Trades Charges with China, Others Over Responsibility for Doha
Impasse, supra note 288.
294. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE,
supra note 15, at 77-141 (analyzing this proposal and other proposals at the time in
response to it).
295. Chris Giles, Acrimony Dashes Doha Hopes, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0059fl06-f084-11dd-972c-0000779fd2ac.html (paraphrasing
Minister Nath). Following the sweeping victory of the Congress Party in India's general
election in May 2009, and the postelection cabinet reshuffle, Mr. Nath was reassigned as
Minister of Road Transport and Highways. His replacement as Minister of Commerce
and Industry was Anand Sharma. Speculation in the Indian media about the shift was
that Mr. Sharma might prove more diplomatic in trade negotiations than Mr. Nath, given
that Mr. Sharma had experience at the Ministry of External Affairs. Kamal Nath's New
Portfolio Takes Industry by Surprise, INDO ASIAN NEWS SERVICE (May 28, 2009, 11:52
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December 2008 Draft Agriculture Text, the U.S. received much of what
it had sought all along in the Doha Round, including:
* Base periods, which would apply only to the U.S., to
calculate Product-Specific Support in the Amber and Blue
Boxes.
* Relatively deeper cuts that would apply to EU and
Japanese overall trade-distorting domestic support
("OTDS"), and significant reduction commitments that
would apply to Total aggregate measure of support ("AMS")
domestic support in the EU and Japan.
* A broader definition of the "Blue Box" to include counter-
cyclical payments.
* Incorporation by reference into Product-Specific Blue Box
caps of spending limits in the 2002 Farm Bill. 29 6
To be sure, this Text was more than a mere transcription of the
American negotiating position. The Text did not bestow upon the U.S.
all it had sought. The U.S. had opposed, for example, any Product-
Specific limits in the Blue Box. Nonetheless, poor countries hardly
could be pleased.
In light of that middle "D," provisions written explicitly for the U.S.
ought to have proved embarrassing. They were not justified for all rich
countries, which somehow might have made them thinly defensible.
They were just for the richest one. They raised the question why
American farmers ought to get better treatment than their counterparts
in Australia, Canada, the EU, or New Zealand, to which the U.S.
provided no answer other than it had to get what it wanted or there
would be no Doha Round deal. 2 9 7
PM), http://www.india-forums.com/news/business/177246-kamal-nath-new-portfolio-takes-
industry-by-surprise.htm. A different conjecture was Mr. Nath was needed to deal with
India's infamous transportation infrastructure problems. G. Seetharaman, For Infra
Firms, Nath's Just the Man, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (June 4, 2009, 1:29 IST),
http://www.dnaindia.com/money/reportfor-infra-firms-naths-just-the-man_1261748.
296. See Committee on Agriculture, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
agric-e/agchairtxt dec08-a e.pdf.
297. Following the failure to call a Ministerial meeting at year-end 2008, the Financial
Times commented:
The reasons for the stalemate in the Doha talks were much the same as they
have been for years. The U.S. is demanding more access for its farmers and
manufacturers than the big emerging markets are willing to give - and
displaying its own lack of will in confronting domestic constituencies by
reducing those farmers' subsidies in return.
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Even more embarrassing ought to have been the intransigent
American position on cotton. Since at least May 2006, when the World
Bank published a study, the effects of cotton subsidies (and their
possible removal) on poor countries were well known: 298
[The] World Bank study noted that nearly half the
global cotton production occurred in the United States and
China. In 2002, the African and Central Asian countries
that relied heavily on cotton exports had an average per
capita income of less than 80 U.S. cents per day.
Meanwhile, exports from these countries competed with
heavily subsidized U.S. exports in the international
market.
The study found that if cotton subsidies and import
tariffs are eliminated, global prices would rise by an
average 12.9 percent. In addition, production would
decrease by one quarter in the U.S. and by one half in the
EU. As a result, the global share of exports from
developing countries would increase from 52 percent to 72
percent. As to farmers' incomes, removal of cotton market
distortions would lead to a one sixth decline in US farmers'
income and by more than one half in the EU. For sub-
Saharan African farmers, incomes would increase by 30
percent.299
For the U.S. to link its position to moves by China, knowing full
well China's own limited room to maneuver given its concerns about the
Uyghurs in Xinjiang, could lead to only one result: selling short the
needs of the neediest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Alongside cotton, the SSM was possibly the most critical Doha
Round issue, at least in the agricultural negotiations, for poor countries.
Fights over this issue were the proximate cause of the collapse of the
July 2008 Ministerial meeting. The first five days of talks (Monday, 21
July through Friday, 25 July) during that meeting - a meeting
Editorial, The Broken Promise of Doha, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.ft.com
/intl/cms/s/0/14be4348-cba6-1ldd-ba02000077b07658.html#axzzlhfylAE50.
298. See generally Kym Anderson & Ernesto Valenzuela, The World Trade
Organization's Doha Cotton Initiative: A Tale of Two Issues (World Bank Dev. Research
Grp., Working Paper WPS3918, 2006), available at www-wds.worldbank.org/external
/default/WDSContentServer/WDSPIB/2006/05/05/00001640620060505160536/Rendered
PDF/wps3918.pdf (discussing cotton production, trade and economics in developing
countries).
299. Robert W. Njoroge, ABA Sec. Int'l L., Global Fiscal Crisis: A Moment for the Doha
Round?, III INT'L TRADE COMM. NEWSLETTER no. 1, at 8-10 (2008).
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originally planned to end on the sixth day (Saturday, 26 July) -
summed to nothing. The U.S. and EU singled India out for blame for
insisting rich countries make real cuts to their farm subsidies, yet
tolerate protection by poor countries of their infant industries. One
trade official said of then-Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry,
Kamal Nath: "He just sat there and said 'No' for 12 straight hours"
[ending at 3:30 a.m. on Thursday, 24 July]. 300
From the perspective of Minister Nath, there was good reason to
say "No."
Since 1980, the 62-year old celebrity Indian politician had
represented, almost without interruption, in the Lok Sabha (India's
Lower House of Parliament), Chhindwara.o1 That is a poor, rural
district of 1.8 million in the state of Madhya Pradesh, with 60 million
people. The farmers in his district are lucky to have a plot of one-half a
hectare, hence commercial farming on a developed country scale is not
easy to imagine. Soybean planters in Chhindwara are directly harmed
by subsidized American soybeans. 302 Like it or not, Minister Nath
knew subsistence farming in a way few developed country trade
negotiators can appreciate.
In this context, however understandable the American concern was
that poor countries would abuse an SSM if its volume triggers were too
low and thwart access to their markets of American farm products
through higher-than-pre-Doha Round tariffs, the concern of poor
countries was still more important. What the Americans see as a trade
issue the likes of China and India see as a food security issue. No less
an authority than the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food, Olivier De Schutter, argues that WTO agricultural accords
wrongly treat food like any other commodity, instead of respecting the
human right to food. International trade has failed to feed the hungry,
and to help poor countries feed themselves. 303
Of the nearly one billion people who are hungry in the world, half
of them are small-scale farmers in these countries. 304 Of this half -
nearly 500 million people - 80 percent are directly engaged in food
production. The other 20 percent are landless laborers or fishermen.
The SSM remedy is essential, argues the Special Rapporteur, "to
300. John W. Miller, Indian Minister Frustrates West at Trade Talks, WALL ST. J. (July
25, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121691447068181327.html (quoting an
unnamed trade official).
301. Alan Beattie, India's Local Hero Evokes Mixed Emotions on World Trade Circuit,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/0/da83addc-cOdb-1ldd-bOa8-0000
77b07658.html#axzzld4v3jlaj.
302. Id.
303. Jonathan Lynn, U.N. Expert Says Trade Will Not Feed Hungry, REUTERS (Dec.
17, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USLH737725.
304. Id.
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insulate fragile domestic farm markets [in poor countries] from volatile
global prices and import surges." 305 To be sure, food that is traded
internationally accounts for an average of just 15 percent of total world
food output. That statistic might suggest developing and least
developed countries need more trade, not less, in food. But, from their
perspective of food security, they need enhanced capacity to produce
food, and not suffer the vicissitudes of the global marketplace - namely,
price volatility, import surges, and susceptibility to food that is
subsidized and dumped by rich nations.
The long and bloody history of revolutions, both in Asia and the
western world, provides the capstone argument for China, India, and
other developing countries. Rural poverty has catalyzed social and
political upheaval, even whole revolutions. Cases in point are China in
the 19th and early 20th centuries, and France in the late 18th
century.306 Compounding fears of history repeating itself are
dislocations in the export-oriented manufacturing sectors of China and
India. Even before the onset of severe recessionary conditions in late
2008, China alone had 87,000 public order disturbances - in 2005, when
its GDP grew at an annual rate of over 10 percent. 307 In brief, the
position held by most poor countries on the SSM is more than a devilish
technical detail. Fitting squarely within the middle "D" of the DDA, the
SSM implicates a truly grand theme.
As a final point about the middle "D," it is important for developing
countries - especially major ones - to assume responsibility for
fostering a coherent world trade regime in which the poverty-alleviating
effects of trade may be felt. The U.S. points out, rightly, that South-
South trade must increase, i.e., poor countries must lift themselves out
of poverty in part by trading more with each other than they do.308
Likewise, the Financial Times declares that successful conclusion of the
Doha Round requires: development activists giving up the founding
myth of Doha - that western farm subsidies and tariffs, outrageous as
they are, the main obstacle to poor nations' integrating with the global
economy. 30 9
305. Id.
306. See CHRONIC POVERTY RESEARCH CENTER, Understanding Poverty in China, in
CHRONIC POVERTY REPORT 87-88 (2005), available at http://www.chronicpoverty.
org/uploads/publicationfiles/CPR1_chaplO.pdf; The French Revolution, NEW WORLD
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/FrenchRevolution (last
visited Nov. 11, 2011).
307. Geoff Dyer, Unmade in China, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/
39a06e68-cbdb- 11dd-ba02-000077b07658.html.
308. See Amy Tsui, USTR Seeks Coherent World trade Regime in WTO, Trade Among
Developing Nations, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 73 (Jan. 15, 2009).
309. Editorial, Life After Doha, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.ft.com
/cms/s/0/f759d08a-69ee-11e0-89db-00144feab49a.html.
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To be sure, calling that proposition "the founding myth" may be an
overstatement. Moreover, the U.S. has its own interests at stake: many
American businesses operate in multiple developing countries, and
would benefit from reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers that inhibit
these businesses from supplying goods (either for captive consumption
or the merchant market) developing country boundaries. That said,
developing countries like Brazil, China, and India shoulder a
responsibility that goes beyond the matter of access of American exports
to their markets. As long as they inhibit real trade flows amongst
themselves and other developing countries, they block the evolution of a
coherent trade regime in which countries at the same and different
levels of development participate. 310
F. The Mexican Plan Spurned
To its credit, on 29 January 2011, Mexico floated a proposal to heal
the schisms in the Doha Round and re-focus efforts on the middle "D."
It was a horizontal plan, as it cut across four sectors: 311
(1) Agriculture
Developed countries would be obligated to make further reductions
in farm subsidies, bringing their cuts closer to what they currently
spend, and would be prohibited from shielding their most profitable
farm products from major tariff cuts. That is, they would have to
reduce OTDS to a level between what the December 2008 draft
modalities text required, on the one hand, and their current actual
spending, on the other hand. Moreover, developed countries would be
required to bind an applied agricultural tariff rate if that rate was
below the level that would result from the tiered-reduction formula cut
required by the draft text. Finally, developed countries could not
designate more than 6 percent of their farm tariff lines as "Sensitive" (a
ceiling Canada and Japan had long-since rejected).312
(2) NA MA
All developing countries would be obliged to participate in at least
two of the fourteen sectoral initiatives. A developed country would have
310. Similarly, the large amount of tariff revenues collected by one developing country
on imports from another developing country bespeaks the reliance of these countries on
customs duties for government revenue. Thus, openness to South - South trade is linked
to reform of domestic tax regimes in poor countries, with a view to enhancing income and
sales tax collection systems. Such reform, in turn, often depends on a serious anti-
corruption campaign, as well as enhanced administrative systems for recording and
keeping track of assets.
311. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Rejects Mexican Initiative to Advance Doha Talks, Insists on
Bilateral Approach, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 214 (Feb. 10, 2011).
312. Id.
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to participate in any sectoral initiative that it sponsored. Both
developing and developed countries could take advantage of a basket
approach, whereby they could make different tariff commitments in
different product sectors. In the first basket, on a certain percentage of
tariff lines (which the Mexican proposal did not spell out), they would
cut tariffs to zero. In the second basket, they would cut tariffs by a
percentage (again, not spelled out) beyond what the Swiss Formula
required. In this basket, developed countries would have to cut tariffs
to a greater extent than developing ones. The third basket would be
available only to developing countries. In it, these countries could put
tariff lines and thereby exempt them from any cuts beyond what the
Swiss Formula required. Every WTO Member could choose what tariff
lines it put in what basket. Developed countries would have 5 years to
make the cuts to tariff rates in each basket, and developing countries
would have 10 years. For both groups of countries, the cuts would be in
equal annual amounts. 313
(3) Services
Both developing and developed countries would be obligated to
convert existing services market liberalization into bound GATS
commitments. They could exempt a set number of services sectors from
this requirement, but they could do so only if they had participated in
the July 2008 signaling conference. Developing countries would be able
to exempt a larger number of sectors than developed ones. 314
(4) Environmental Goods
Both developed and developing countries would have to reduce
tariffs on environmental groups substantially, that is, to a greater
degree than required under the Swiss Formula. Developed countries
would have to cut those tariffs to zero. Developing countries would
have to slash them to a level below what the Swiss Formula would
mandate. The Doha Round negotiating group on trade and
environment would establish a list of "environmental goods," and
developed and developing countries would select goods from that list.
But, developed countries would have to pick more environmental goods
on which to cut tariffs than developing ones.
Within days, on 4 February, the U.S. rejected the plan. 3 15 It
returned to its refrain that the major emerging markets of Brazil,
China, and India must open themselves further to agricultural and
manufactured goods, and services, beyond what they set out in the
December 2008 texts. The Mexican proposal failed to obligate Brazil,
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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China, or India to participate in the key chemicals and industrial
machinery initiatives. Moreover, said the U.S., the plan was
incomplete. It failed to address the agriculture SSM, industrial non-
tariff barriers ("NTBs"), and AD-CVD disciplines. Bluntly, intoned the
U.S., the American business community and Congress would not
approve the Mexican proposal.316
V. SPECIAL TRADE DISPENSATIONS TO WIN MUSLIM HEARTS AND MINDS
A. Developing Stakeholders
Poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity everywhere. That
common sense point is even truer when the poverty is in Muslim
countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia), or among Muslim communities in non-
Muslim countries (e.g., India). The fact is that in the post-9/11 era,
many extremist ideologies are in the name of Islam, although in truth
they are anything but "Islamic"; rather, they are un-Islamic. 317 In brief,
the connection between economic growth, poverty alleviation, and
reduced vulnerability to Islamist extremism is or should be readily
apparent. That is not to say trade, in spurring growth and reducing
poverty, is a panacea for terrorism. Rather, to be a successful counter-
terrorist strategy, trade requires complimentary and salubrious
structures and policies at the domestic level. Reducing corruption and
sound fiscal and monetary policies are examples.
Still, the link between trade and national security is clear enough:
developed countries can help themselves in the long run by helping
Islamic countries and communities integrate broadly and deeply into
the world trading system. Doing so helps provide Muslims with a well-
grounded sense of stake holding in this system. Yet, one of the most
extraordinary features of the December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts is
they say nothing explicitly about the Islamic world. 318 For all the
categories these texts create among WTO Members, one cohort they do
not treat as such is the one made up of Muslim countries. Indeed, that
is true of all the major Doha Round documents.
Consider cotton. From the Uyghur people to many residents of the
Cotton Four countries, the farmers are Muslim. The adjustment costs
to the U.S. and other non-Muslim developed countries of cotton market
access and subsidy concessions might be more than offset by the
economic, political, and national security gains from healthier,
wealthier cotton farmers in western China and Sub-Saharan Africa. 319
316. Id.
317. See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI'A) 1359-81 (2011).
318. See Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, supra note 296.
319. See Nioroge, supra note 299, at 10.
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Similar arguments can be made in other agricultural and industrial
sectors. The Doha Round was launched in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001. A key reason for meeting in Doha, and
pushing through the DDA, was to show that evil extremists not only are
un-Islamic, but also are hideously lousy economists. The world - aside
from the extremists - has a shared interest in cross-border commercial
intercourse and therefore in the concomitant necessary conditions of
peace and security. War impedes trade, and as trade declines, so does
job and income growth. These points hold as true for Muslims as for
Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Sikhs, and so on.
To be sure, aside from particular issues arising under the SharT'a
(Islamic Law), such as forbidden products (alcohol, pork, and
pornography), forbidden banking transactions (those that involve rTba,
which loosely translated is interest), and forbidden insurance policies
(those that involve gharar, which means uncertainty), there is no such
thing as "Muslim trade law." That is similarly true of other faiths -
there is no Catholic trade law, for instance, though Catholic countries
may have distinct concerns about certain trade policies and their
implications.
B. Grim Statistics
Nevertheless, Muslim countries are in need of better integration
into the GATT-WTO order. Consider a few stark realities about just the
Arab Muslim world: 320
* The GDP of Arab countries combined is (as of 1999) $531.2,
which is less than that of Spain.
* The total value of non-oil exports from Arab countries is
less than that of Finland. There are 300 million people in
the Arab world and five million people in Finland.
* During the 1990s, the growth rate of exports from Arab
countries was 1.5 percent per year. The average global
growth rate was six percent.
* The export base of Arab countries is not diversified. Oil
and oil-related products account for 70 percent of their
exports.
* Regarding intellectual development, Arab countries lag
behind the rest of the world. The number of books
translated each year into Arabic in the entire Arab Muslim
world is just 20 percent of the number translated into
Greek in Greece. The number of books published per
million people in the Arab Muslim world (whether written
320. Bernard Lewis, Free at Last? The Arab World in the Twenty-First Century, 88
FOREIGN AFF. 77, 81-83 (2009).
316 VOL. 40:1-3
DEBACLE OF DOHA ROUND COUNTER-TERRORISM
in Arabic, or translated into Arabic) is lower than every
other region of the world, except Sub-Saharan Africa.
* On intellectual property (IP) generation, the Arab countries
also lag behind the rest of the world. Between 1980 and
2000, Israel registered 7,652 patents in the U.S. Korea
registered 16,328 patents in the U.S. In that same 20-year
period, Saudi Arabia led the Arab Muslim world in
registering patents in the U.S. - with a pathetic 171. Egypt
had 77, Kuwait 52, the United Arab Emirates 32, Syria 20,
and Jordan 15. Further, Arab countries have one of the
lowest numbers of research scientists who publish
frequently cited articles.
* Concerning education, the Arab countries again lag behind
the rest of the world. In 2003, China began publishing a list
of the 500 best universities in the world. None of the over
200 Arab universities were on that list, nor do any of them
appear in the subsequent annual rankings. Even when the
in list is narrowed to the Asia-Pacific region (covering the
Middle East), no Arab university is listed.
* In political development, the countries of the Middle East
and North Africa are consistently ranked by Freedom
House as having the lowest freedom rating.
* On women's rights, nowhere in the world is the situation
more dreadful than in Arab countries. Women account for
slightly more than half of the Arab population, but they are
largely absent from economic and political life, and (as is
widely known) from the driver's seat in cars in Saudi
Arabia.
* On overall average standard of living, only Sub-Saharan
Africa has a lower figure than Arab countries.
Depending on the outcome of the Arab Spring, many of these
statistics might improve. In the meantime, contrary to assertions by
Islamic extremists, neither supposedly wicked foreign powers, nor the
legacy of the Crusades or colonialism, are to blame. Arabs are
responsible for themselves and their children.
To be sure, all or some of these statistics may improve after the
Arab Spring, assuming countries newly liberated from their
monstrously corrupt and economically unhelpful autocrats adopt
prudent economic policies. Yet, for now, candidly, these realities are
scary. Left unchanged, they play into the evil hands of extremists.
That is because Arab masses - the street, as it were - are at risk of
developing a sense of exclusion. All faith that domestic politicians and
the global economic regime can help change reality for the better is lost.
The poison of extremism may appear an antidote.
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C. New Ideas Faithful to the Original Purpose
The obvious inference from the above-listed points is the Doha
Round should have focused in part on boosting trade with and among
Muslim countries. Because it has failed to do so, the perception among
Arab countries, and throughout the Islamic world, that the Round has
failed to address the above-listed challenges is not irrational.
If susceptibility to fanatical ideologies and recruitment by VEOs, on
the one hand, and oppressive economic circumstances (or the perception
thereof), on the other hand, are linked (and they are, as Part One of the
Trilogy argues), then the Doha Round was a strategic opportunity to
forge trade-generating, poverty-alleviating rules. Perhaps it is not too
late to resurrect the Round, restoring it to its original, counter-terrorist
purpose via a package of proposals faithful to that purpose. They might
include the following:
* An accelerated accession of Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,
and Syria into the WTO;
* Duty-free treatment for all non-oil exports, without
exceptions for T & A and footwear, and for otherwise
sensitive farm products, from all Muslim countries;
* A list of farm and industrial products of potential future
keen export interest to Muslim countries, and demand free
trade on those products;
* A "Muslim Sectoral Agreement," to be followed by all WTO
Members, without exception; or
* Support for fisherman in Muslim countries to enhance their
livelihoods in an environmentally sustainable way;
* A "Muslim Technical Facility," to boost as rapidly as
possible the legal capacity in trade ministries from Morocco
to Malaysia, particularly on trade facilitation issues.
Indubitably, there are other terms of a package oriented to reform
in the Muslim world.
To be sure, elements of a Doha Round deal faithful to the original
purpose of the Round would not change all the grim realities in Islamic
World in the short term. They would not deliver an immediate,
crushing blow against VEOs. But, they would be practically
insignificant, yet symbolically important, steps.
D. The "Islamic" Delineation
To take such steps, important considerations about inclusion would
need to be resolved. Should such a package cover all Islamic countries,
namely, all 57 countries in the Organization of the Islamic Conference
("OIC")? Should it cover only OIC countries that are WTO Members?
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Should it exclude OIC countries with high per capita incomes, like the
Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC") states? Should emphasis be on the
Arab Muslim countries? How should Muslim communities in non-OIC
countries, like India or Singapore, be treated? In resolving these
matters, every effort should be toward inclusiveness. After all, the goal
ought to be to win minds and hearts of Muslims - the entire community
(ummah) - regardless of international boundaries. To put the point
more pragmatically, VEOs recruit from that ummah in disregard of
those boundaries, hence a positive, pro-active trade reform agenda
should contest on those same recruitment grounds.
However these questions are resolved, one matter should be
obvious. There is nothing wrong with singling out OIC countries, or a
subset of them. As this Trilogy shows, to a nearly ludicrous extent the
Doha Round draft modalities texts create hair-splitting delineations
among WTO Members, both as sub-groups and individuals. Examples
include net food importing developing countries ("NFIDCs"), RAMs,
SVEs, countries in the Southern African Customs Union ("SACU"), and
Bolivia, as well as - shamefully - rich countries like Canada, Japan,
Norway, and the U.S. To establish these delineations for flexibilities or
S & D treatment but eschew an "Islamic" category is unjustifiable.
Worse yet, it is irresponsible in the post-9/11 climate, given the
persistence (even exacerbation) of global poverty, and continued threats
posed by VEOs acting in the name of "Islam."
There are three possible explanations for the willingness of
Members to countenance the metastasizing of S & D treatment rules to
all such sub-groups and individuals - except Muslim countries. One is
cynical: the Members never intended to help those countries in the first
place. Doing so was just part of the rhetoric surrounding the launch of
the Round, rhetoric necessary to agree on the DDA in the first place.
This explanation is difficult to prove, and smacks of being a "cop out."
The second explanation is atmospheric: WTO Members are too
politically correct to agree on a distinction based on religion, and fear
offending Islamic countries by intimating a link between a particular
religion and terrorism. Why not, then, help Members in all the other
categories (e.g., NFIDCs, RAMs, and SVEs), which then will help
Muslim countries? After all, those countries are scattered among the
non-religiously based categories. This explanation, if true, suggests the
Members are willing to entertain a remarkably roundabout, inefficient
way of helping the ummah. Surely the better approach is to target the
problem, as it were, directly.
The third explanation is realistic: sincere as they were in their
original purpose for the Doha Round, the Members are politically and
economically unable to resist their domestic business constituencies,
which put short-term selfish interest above the long-term common good.
This explanation best fits the facts. Commercial self-interest is
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empirically verifiable lurking throughout the rules championed by
various Members in the negotiating texts.
Unfortunately, led by a French Director-General, Pascal Lamy, for
much of the Doha Round, one who works in a secular international
organization in a Europe that sometimes prides itself as post-religious,
questions about identifying poor, Islamic countries in need of special
trade rules to fight poverty and thereby extremism never were asked.
Mr. Lamy himself has grasped at any reason to justify the Round,
except the most obvious one confronted every day, in dozens of
countries, by brave men and women who serve, for example, in
charitable, non-governmental organizations or in Special Operations
Forces ("SOF") of the military. Preach the virtues of free trade, yes, but
preach the link between free trade, religion, and a better future; Mr.
Lamy would have none of it.
Rather, anointing major developing countries - Brazil, China, and
India - into the elite group of WTO Members that could make or break
a deal in the confines of the Green Room of the WTO Secretariat is as
much of a revolution as the Director-General and Secretariat could
orchestrate, tolerate, or imagine. Islam calls roughly 1.3 billion people,
second only to Christianity, with about 2.2 billion followers. Who in
that Green Room represents the Muslim world? Those three
newcomers? The U.S. and EU, which hold fast to their traditional
Green Room places and remain the final arbiters of any Doha Round
deal?
The anointing of Brazil, China, and India also is part of the
unwinding of the relatively straightforward, Uruguay Round era
distinction among developed, developing, and least developed countries.
It is redolent of the metastasizing of categories among WTO Members.
Yet, if there is to be a new category, then surely that of "Islam" is as, or
more compelling and as, or more consistent with the DDA, than any
other category.
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